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I.

Introduction
In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,1 the United States Supreme Court established
substantive limitations to state taxation under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause2 and under the Commerce Clause’s negative sweep.3 Quill is recognized as the
principal and preeminent statement of these important Constitutional principles limiting
state taxing jurisdiction and authority.4
Certainly, states often view restrictions on their taxing authority as unwelcome.5
A recent opinion of the Supreme Court of Connecticut represents the most extreme of
these cases. In Chase Manhattan Bank v. Gavin,6 the Supreme Court of Connecticut7
upheld the imposition of Connecticut income taxes on a New York trustee.8 The trustee

1

Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U. S. 298, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 119 L.Ed.2d 91, (1992).

2

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

3

Quill, 504 U.S. at 309. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, (1824)
(recognizing the negative power of the Commerce Clause).

4

See, e.g., Scholastic Book Club, Inc. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 567 N.W.2d. 692 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997);
Magnetek Controls, Inc. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 562 N.W.2d 219 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997); Town Crier, Inc. v.
Dep’t of Revenue, 733 N.E.2d 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).

5

See, e.g., Blue, infra at Note 118; John Caher, State Tax Ruling Roils Controversy with Neighbors,
N.Y.L.J., (2001) (analyzing a fight between New York and Connecticut over allocation of a Connecticut
resident's salary from a New York University). See Bernard E. Jacob, An Extended Presence, Interstate
Style: First Notes on a Theme from Saenz, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1133 (2002).
6

Chase Manhattan Bank v. Gavin, 249 Conn. 172, 733 A.2d 782 (Conn. 1999) (referenced in this article as
“Gavin”).
7

Concurring in Justice Borden’s opinion were Justices Callahan, Norcott, Palmer, and Peters. Justices
McDonald and Berdon dissented. Id. at 806.

8

The case involved taxation of four testamentary trusts of Connecticut decedents and one inter vivos trust
(the Adolffson Trust) established by a Connecticut resident as settlor. The testamentary trusts ranged from
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had no presence whatsoever in Connecticut.9 The trustee, all trust assets applicable state
trust law, and all trust administration were outside of Connecticut.10 Indeed, the essential
“critical link” cited by the Supreme Court of Connecticut to justify Connecticut’s taxation
of the New York inter vivos trustee’s income was that the trust’s sole, noncontingent
beneficiary was a Connecticut resident.11

Connecticut’s sole contact with the

testamentary trusts was the decedent settlor’s residence in Connecticut at the time of
death, in one instance sixty-three years earlier.12 Such testamentary trusts, however, were
formed under New York law with New York administration and New Trustee.13 In such
circumstances, domicile of the decedent should not be controlling.14
The Connecticut tax at issue was imposed upon the New York trustee’s entire
accumulated, undistributed income and gains from the trust property.15 Connecticut’s
authority to tax its own resident, i.e., the inter vivos trust’s Connecticut beneficiary, on
the beneficiary’s income from any domestic or foreign source is unquestioned.16 This

24 to 63 years old, having been formed many years previously under New York law by Connecticut
decedents. Id. at 786-87.
9

Id. at 787.

10

Id.

11

Id. at 802.

12

Id. at 787.

13

See infra, Note 143, discussing District of Columbia v. Chase.

14

Id. Domicile should not be controlling, or even relevant.

15

Gavin at 785, 802.

16

See Schaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37(1920).
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would clearly include distributed and even distributable income of a foreign trustee if
Connecticut law had imposed such a tax on the resident beneficiary.17
Gavin, however, held the New York trustee’s undistributed or undistributable
income taxable. In doing so, the Connecticut Supreme Court failed to honor the
admonitions of Quill that a taxpayer must initiate its own due process contacts with the
taxing jurisdiction.18 The Gavin opinion also gave little attention to the Supreme Court’s
Commerce Clause analysis19 which was essential to the Court’s rejection of North
Dakota’s tax levy against Quill. To the limited extent Gavin addressed the Connecticut
tax’s discriminatory effect on interstate commerce, it misapplied Quill.20 The Connecticut
justices also refused to follow a clear line of well-reasoned and authoritative cases21 that
went clearly against their Gavin holding.22
The opinion then played a shell game of words in order to artificially place its
facts as to the inter vivos trust within those of a single, California case it cited as
precedent,23 the facts, law, and holding of which were completely different.24 The
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McGuire v. Trefry, 253 U.S. 12 (1920). See discussion infra Part III A.

18

See supra Notes 1-4 and accompanying text. Also, see infra, Parts V, VI, and VII.

19

See discussion infra Part VII.

20

See infra Note 211, et seq. and accompanying text.

21

See Nenno & Sparks, Delaware Dynasty Trust, at 32, published by Wilmington Trust, Wilmington
Delaware: “The court's constitutional analysis particularly for the inter vivos trust is unpersuasive.”

22

See infra Note 289.

23

McCulloch v. Franchise Tax Bd., 61 Cal. 2d 186, 37 Cal. Rptr. 636, 643 (1964), 390 P.2d 412 (Cal.
1964), (citations omitted), appeal dismissed, 379 US 133, 85 S. Ct. 278 (1964).
24

See discussion infra Part VIII.
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McCulloch case involved a unique California statute which was the predecessor of
federal throwback rules.25
The purpose of this article is to point out flaws in Gavin’s analysis and thereby
hopefully lessen any inappropriate mischief to Constitutional principles that may result
from its misguided holding.26
The article first analyzes pre-Quill case law, and then discusses the Quill opinion.
Thereafter, Gavin’s holding will be reviewed in light of this line of precedent cases,
including its clearly misplaced reliance on McCulloch27, the only precedent it cited for
taxation of the inter vivos trust.
It is the recurring theme of this article that Constitutional due process analysis of
state taxation of trusts has lost its way. Courts must return to the fundamental principles
of the law of trusts. A “trust” is not “a legal person” or “an entity.” In applying due
process minimal contacts analysis, one must first determine what a “trust” is and what
person’s contacts with the taxing state must be analyzed.

That is, in evaluating

sufficiency of nexus for due process purposes, the law looks to the contacts of the
“trustee” as a legal entity, not to contacts of a “trust”, an abstraction, or to a beneficiary?

II.

Synopsis of the Law of Trusts: Inter Vivos v. Testamentary
A. A “trust” is not a legal person under state law.
25

See infra Note 246

26

See Jordan M. Goodman, State Taxation of Business Trusts: Limits, Concerns and Opportunities, 9 Feb.
J. Multistate Tax’n 6 (2000).

27

See supra, Note 23.
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The artificial nature of trusts complicates jurisdictional analysis. A trustee is a
legal person whether corporate or human.

The term “trust” means “a fiduciary

relationship with respect to property, subjecting the person [trustee] by whom the title to
the property is held to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of another
person [beneficiary], which arises as a result of a manifestation of an intention to create
it.”28 Thus a trust is not a legal entity or person, but merely a “fiduciary relationship”
whereby the trustee, a legal person, owns property subject to the duty to administer it on
behalf of the beneficiary, a separate legal person. The property and associated income
subject to this fiduciary duty is the fiduciary’s, i.e., the trustee’s. Such property and
affiliated income is not held by any separate, distinct legal entity referred to as “the
trust,” and not by the beneficiary.29 A trust is a fiction, i.e. an abstraction.30
As an “abstraction,” a trust may not sue or be sued or hold and transfer title to
property in its own name.31 A trustee can sue or be sued based on the trustee’s actions or
to determine issues pertaining to property held in such trustee’s name.32 The trustee need
not sue in his name as trustee but solely in the trustee’s own name without reference to

28

The Restatement, Second, Trusts, Section 2. [Emphasis added.] I Scott, Trusts Section 2.3 (4th ed. 1987).
Also see Randolph Foundation v. Appeal from Probate Court 2001 WL 418059 (2001), at 16 (trust is an
abstraction).
29

In the 1913 Revenue Act, Section II, Paragraph D, the fiduciary withheld tax for the beneficiary's tax
liability. Since 1916 taxes imposed on a "trust" are in reality fiduciary income taxes imposed on the
fiduciary person in such person's capacity as fiduciary. See e.g. 26 U.S.C. Section 641(b), and McCauley v.
Comm., 44 F22 919(CCA5, 1930).

30

See Randolph Foundation, supra, Note 28.

31

See infra, Note 32.

32

“The trustee can maintain such actions at law or suits in equity or other proceedings against a third
person as he could maintain if he held the trust property free of trust.” Restatement, Second, Trusts, §280.
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the trust relationship.33 Furthermore, a beneficiary is in no way an agent of the trustee
nor a necessary or even proper party to an action by the trustee.34 A trust has no
existence separate from the persons who hold differing interests therein. Modern “entity
law”35 generally recognizes the following legal persons: corporations, legal liability
companies, general partnerships, limited liability partnerships, limited partnerships,
REIT’S, and qualifying business trusts.36
The law of trusts applies to both inter vivos trusts and testamentary trusts. A trust
may be created during the owner’s lifetime through transfer of property by deed to a
trustee. For testamentary trusts, property is merely transferred from the decedent by will
to a trustee. Transfer of property to a trustee by deed or by will merely reflects two
different methods of creating a trust relationship.37 The method of transfer does not alter
in any way requirements for creation of a trust relationship, e.g. settlor or testator’s
capacity, intention to create a trust, designation of a beneficiary, duties to be performed
by a trustee, etc.38 Each method requires an effective transfer of property to a trustee,
irrespective of the instrument used to accomplish such a transfer, i.e. deed, assignment, or
will.

33

Id., subsection (h).

34

Id., subsection (i).

35

See Blumberg, The Corporate Entity In An Era of Multinational Corporations, 15 DEJCL 283,286.

36

, Current Issues in Conveyance Practices, 15438 NBI-CLE 1, 7.

37

ULA Trust Code Sec 401. "Methods of Creating Trust. A trust may be created by: (1) transfer of
property to another person as trustee during the settlor's lifetime or by will or other disposition taking effect
upon the settlor's death." Restatement, Second, Trusts Sec. 17.
38

Id., Section 402
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The law of the settlor’s or testator’s residence generally39 controls the
effectiveness of the transferring instrument, whether that instrument is a deed or a will.40
In the context of an inter vivos transfer, the transferor’s compliance with a state’s statute
of frauds or formalities for real estate deeds allows the resident transferor to effectively
transfer property to the trustee.41

In the context of a testamentary transfer,

transferor/decedent’s compliance with a state’s statute of wills and probate formalities
similarly allows the resident to effectively transfer property to the trustee by will at
death.42
These resident state laws directly apply to and benefit the state’s resident, whether
inter vivos transferor or decedent. These and other state laws of the transferor’s domicile
indirectly benefit any transferee, resident or nonresident, on the other side of any such
transfer or transaction.43
Just as with an inter vivos trust, a testator may designate in his will which state
law, other than the law of testator’s residence, to apply to governance of the trust.44
Likewise, the testator may designate administration in a nondomiciliary state and may

39

Except, for example, effective transfer of real estate is determined by the law of the situs state.

40

See infra, Note 46.

41

In the context of sales, compliance with the U.C.C. or a state's common law of contracts similarly
enables a transferor to effectively transfer property.

42

43

See infra, Note 46.
See discussion of Quill infra, at Notes 185- 186, and accompanying text.

44

ULA Trust Code Sec 107. "Governing Law. The meaning and effect of a trust are determined by: (1)
the law of the jurisdiction designated in the terms unless the designation of that jurisdiction's law is
contrary to a strong public policy of the jurisdiction having the most significant relationship to the matter at
issue; or . . ." [Emphasis added]
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select a nonresident trustee.45 In contrast, the validity of the testator’s will as an effective
dispository instrument is determined by the law of the testator’s state of residence.46
Likewise, whether an instrument effectively conveys an interest in land is determined by
the law of the situs of such land.47
State law benefits afforded resident persons cannot, under due process, be
attributed as an indirect benefit to every nonresident with whom such residents have
personal or commercial relationships or dealings.48 If one state can impose tax burdens
on the basis of such imputed state law benefits, every state, county, municipality or other
taxing jurisdiction will have wholly unfettered ability to tax nationwide. Such attribution,
reattribution, or re-reattribution49 would create an infinite chain unwittingly and wrongly
subjecting every person to the jurisdiction of every political subdivision in the nation.
45

ULA Trust Code Sec 108. Principal Place of Administration. (a) Without precluding other means for
establishing a sufficient connection with the designated jurisdiction, terms of a trust designating the
principal place of administration are valid and controlling if: (1) a trustee's principal place of business is
located in or a trustee is a resident of the designated jurisdiction; or (2) all or part of the administration
occurs in the designated jurisdiction. [Emphasis added]
46

Fratcher, William A., Scott on Trusts, 4th Edition, 1989. Sec. 649-650. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
78 S. Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958).
47

Id.

48

See infra, Note 218, et. seq., and accompanying text.

49

In a recent, well-reasoned opinion, the Alabama Administrative Law Division (the "Division") rejected
an attempt by the Alabama Department of Revenue ("ADOR") to impute such benefits under Alabama law.
ADOR was attempting to impute activities of an Alabama limited partnership to its nonresident limited
partner. Lanzi, the limited partner, did not participate in management of the partnership or its assets, did
not own property, earn income, or conduct business in Alabama, and resided in Georgia.49 The Division's
opinion held that the limited partnership was treated as a separate legal entity under Alabama law. The
opinion then stated, "[b]ecause a partnership is a separate entity under current Alabama law, the presence
and activities of a partnership in Alabama cannot be attributed to its nonresident [limited] partners for
nexus purposes. Separate legal entities must be recognized as such." Lanzi v. Alabama Department of
Revenue, No. INC. 02721 (Ala. Admin. Law Div. Sept. 26, 2003). This author acknowledges that he, along
with Donald E. Johnson and David M. Wooldridge of Sirote & Permutt, P.C., represented Mr. Lanzi. The
case is presently on appeal to the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, the Circuit Court of Montgomery
County having held that Alabama did have jurisdiction to tax the nonresident.
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That is why Quill’s due process analysis requires that a nonresident knowingly and
deliberately direct its contacts at the foreign jurisdiction.50

B. What legal “person”51 must have “purposefully directed its activities”52 at a state
in order to meet the minimum contacts standard for due process purposes?
Sufficiency of contacts depends on the nature of the jurisdiction in question. For
an in rem action, contacts with the subject property must be determined.53

For in

personam jurisdiction over a “person,” the contacts of such person must be determined.
Analysis of jurisdiction to tax involves both in rem and in personam jurisdiction. If a
state has jurisdiction as to property, then it has jurisdiction to tax the income from such
property. That does not, however, equate to in personam jurisdiction over the owner of
such property.54
For example, a single member limited liability company (“LLC”) is a disregarded
entity55 for income tax purposes. However, under state laws it is a legal entity which can
hold title to property, conduct business in its own name, and sue or be sued in its own
50

See infra, Notes 185 - 186 and accompanying text; see also Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462
(1985) (taxpayer purposefully directed activities at the taxing state).

51

The term "person" in this article may be an individual, i.e., a human person, or a legally recognized entity
such as a corporation, limited liability company, or partnership.

52

See infra, Note 185.

53

Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees, §292.

54

Lowy and Vasquez, “When is it Unconstitutional for States to Tax Nonresident Members of Limited
Liability Companies,” State Tax Notes, 633 (May 2003). (“The Power to Tax is empty without the power
to collect the tax”. Jurisdiction to tax income is interdependent with personal jurisdiction over the
taxpayer).

55

See e.g. Chief Counsel Advisory, CCA 200216028.
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name.56 Thus income tax laws artificially render such an entity as nonexistent for income
tax purposes. For income tax purposes, the person who is the LLC’s single member is
directly taxed.
Assume such an LLC is formed under the laws of State X, actively conducts
business in State X, and owns property in State X. State X disregards the LLC for
income tax purposes, thereby taxing Y, its single member. If Y is a nonresident of State
X, having no direct contact with State X, can State X tax nonresident Y based solely on
Y’s ownership of the single member interest in the LLC?57
Artificial, constantly evolving tax classifications and elections, should not and do
not58 control the parameters of constitutional due process for tax or other jurisdictional
purposes. States have broad powers to impose income taxes subject only to constitutional
limitations and their own states laws.59 For example, in the context of a trust, tax on
income may and at times is imposed on the settlor/grantor, the trustee, and/or the
beneficiary. In the context of Gavin, Connecticut could tax the Connecticut resident
settlor/grantor of a New York inter vivos trust. Taxation could be based on grantor trust
rules60 or on deemed realization of gain upon transfer of the Connecticut property of such
56

Id.; For a general discussion, See Bishop and Kleinberger, Limited Liability Companies: Tax and
Business Law, 2000 WL 12016.

57

What if this entity under "check the box" Treas. Reg. 301.7701, had elected to be taxed as a corporation?
Should the vagaries of a tax election determine due process nexus? What if the LLC elected to be taxed as
a corporation, but then made a subchapter S election? Should due process analysis change again?

58

See supra, Note 49. Re: Lanzi; e.g. If Quill had been a subchapter S corporation, would its shareholder
owners then have nexus with North Dakota, individually, i.e., would the corporation's contacts be attributed
to its shareholders merely because of a tax election?

59

In addition to due process and commerce clause restrictions, "realization" is a further constitutional
constraint imposed on income taxation. Glenshaw Glass, 349 U.S. 925 (1955).

60

26 U.S.C §§ 671-679.
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a resident to the out-of-state trustee.61 Subject to realization issues,62 Connecticut could
have chosen to tax the Connecticut resident beneficiary on income earned from property
or activities of the nonresident trustee, just as California had done.63 But, if Connecticut
attempts to actually tax the nonresident trustee, the trustee itself must have knowingly
directed its contacts at Connecticut.64

III.

Pre-Quill Cases
Predictably, there is a long line of state and federal cases addressing state

jurisdiction to tax foreign trustees within the limits of federal due process. Following is
an analysis of some of these cases and a summary of the principles they establish.

A. The earliest cases established three broad Constitutional principals.
First, it was established in Bayfield County v. Pishon65 that a state could not tax a
nonresident on income sourced outside such state.66

61

See, e.g. 26 U.S.C. Sections 644 and 877, regarding tax on transfer of appreciated property. Also,
grantor trust rules should apply to all “foreign”, i.e. out of state trusts. See e.g. 26 U.S.C. §679, and infra,
Note 313.

62

A partner, S Corporation shareholder, grantor of a trust, or member of an LLC can be taxed on their
allocable share of related income even though there has been no distribution and even in the absence of
control over such distribution.

63

See infra, Note 217, et. seq., and accompanying text. In Lanzi, supra, Note 49, the Division
acknowledged the power of ADOR to impose its tax through withholding imposed upon the Alabama
Limited Partnership.

64
65

Hanson v. Denckla, supra, Note 46, and Quill, infra, Note 180.
Bayfield County v. Pishon, 156 N.W. 463 (Wis. 1916).

66

The issue was whether Wisconsin could impose a tax on a Wisconsin decedent’s testamentary trust’s
income sourced outside Wisconsin. The trustee, trust property, and beneficiaries were outside Wisconsin.
The court treated the trustee as a nonresident. If a resident, source of income would have been irrelevant.
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Second, the U.S. Supreme Court in Safe Deposit v. Virginia67 held that trust
property has “a situs separate and apart from that” of trust beneficiaries.68 Safe Deposit is
cited for the rule that “the taxing power of a state is restricted to her confines and may not
be exercised in respect of subjects beyond them.”69
Third, in Maguire v. Trefry70, the Supreme Court held that the state of a
beneficiary’s residence could tax the beneficiary on distributions of current income71
irrespective of its source.72 In Simmon73, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

The court held on the facts that trust administration within Wisconsin of the Wisconsin settlor’s
testamentary trust did not result in the trust’s income having a Wisconsin source. Id.
67

In Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, Md. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 280 U.S. 83, 50 S. Ct. 59,
74 L. Ed. 180, Nov. 25, 1929. The trustee was a resident of Maryland, and the beneficiaries were Virginia
residents. Virginia sought to impose an ad valorem tax on trust property based upon the beneficiaries'
Virginia residency.

68

Another early case, Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation v. Simmon, 198 N.E. 741, (1935), is
discussed infra, Note 73. Simmons held a resident of Massachusetts nontaxable on distribution of
accumulated income from a nonresident trustee (state income held to have become nontaxable trust
principal under Mass. statutes).

69

Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia, 305 U.S. 19, 23 (1938). The Court's reasoning on the risk of double
taxation in Safe Deposit would probably not be followed today. Fogel, infra, Note 114, at 180-182.
Pennoyer v. Taxation Div. Dir., 5 N.J. Tax 386, 395-96 (N.J. Tax Ct. 1983).
70

Maguire v. Trefry, 253 U.S. 12 (1920). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld and the United
States Supreme Court affirmed a Massachusetts tax on the Massachusetts resident beneficiary’s income
received from the nonresident trust.
71

Id., at 13-14. The case involved current income distributed to the beneficiary, not accumulated income as
in Simmon, McCulloch, and Gavin, Notes 73, 23, and 6, respectively.

72

The plaintiff beneficiary was a Massachusetts resident. The trust was a testamentary trust of a
Pennsylvania resident being administered under Pennsylvania law and the income producing property was
in Pennsylvania. Id.

73

198 N.E. 741 (1935). See Ferrell, State Taxation of Income Accumulated in Trusts, 51 ABAJ 566 (June
1965).
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ruled, however, that Massachusetts could not tax a Massachusetts resident beneficiary
upon previously accumulated trust income when later distributed by a foreign trustee.74
In 1935, both federal and Massachusetts statutes only taxed a trust beneficiary
when “income,”75 as defined by trust accounting rules, was distributed. The definition of
“income” included only current year income.

Previously accumulated income was

treated as having become inextricably commingled with principal.76 Thus, the foreign
trustee’s distribution of accumulated income was treated as a distribution of principal by
Massachusetts tax statutes.77 A beneficiary’s receipt of principle from an estate or trust is
viewed as a gift, bequest, or return of capital. Nevertheless, receipt of a gift or bequest
could itself constitute “income” for tax purposes.
Income has been defined by the U.S. Supreme Court as an “undeniable accession
to wealth clearly realized and over which the taxpayer has complete dominion.”78
Therefore, there is no Constitutional barrier to taxation of the receipt of property whether
state law treats it as “income” or “principal.” However, federal and Massachusetts tax
statutes exclude gifts and inheritances from taxable income.79 Thus, Massachusetts could

74

“Foreign” meaning the trust had a nonresident settlor, a nonresident trustee, trust property was outside
Massachusetts, and both trust law and trust administration were outside Massachusetts.
75

Federal D.N.I rules did not come into existence until the 1940’s and 1950’s. See Blackburn, Unique
Alabama Trust and Estate Income Tax Rules Create Traps for Alabama Lawyers. 60 Al Law 249 (July,
1999).

76

See infra, Note 250

77

The opinion cited MGLA 62 §§1 and 10.

78

Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 348. U.S. 426, 75 S. Ct. 473 (1935).

79

See, e.g. 26 U.S.C. §102.
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constitutionally have taxed the Massachusetts beneficiary on the distribution, but
statutorily had not taxed it.80
The Simmon opinion was rendered shortly before Professor Roger John Traynor
wrote his classic article on taxation of trusts, settlors, and beneficiaries.81 Thereafter, as
recommended by Professor Traynor, deficiencies in California principal and income
statutes were remedied so as to enable California to later tax its resident beneficiaries
upon actual distribution of previously accumulated trust income.82
Thus, for the better part of a century it has been clear that a state can tax its
residents on all income irrespective of source. The issue in Simmon was the state’s own
principle and income statutes which prevented taxation of residents on receipt of
accumulated trust income, treating it as a nontaxable principal distribution. Nonresidents
can only be taxed on income sourced within the taxing jurisdiction.
B. Later cases more sharply defined the issues.
In Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Murphy,83 a New York resident created
an inter vivos trust governed under Maryland law with a Maryland trustee and a New

80

A revision of Massachusetts’s principal income statutes to redefine income or elimination of the income
tax exclusion for gifts and inheritance taxes would have empowered the state to tax its own resident.

81

Infra, Note; Traynor referenced Simmon, infra, Note 28.

82

See infra, Note 277 and Note 246 and accompanying text. See Cal. Rev. & Tax Code §17745(c) “…
income accumulated by a trust continues to be income even thought the trust provides that the income
(ordinary or capital) shall become a part of the corpus.”

83

Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Murphy, 203 N.E.2d 490 (N.Y. 1964).
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York beneficiary.84 After Grantor’s death85, New York undertook to directly tax the
Maryland trustee on accumulated trust income.86
The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment in
favor of the trustee and against levy of the New York tax. The court reasoned that the
inability of New York to tax the Maryland trustee was not due to the risk of double
taxation. Rather, it was due to “the inability of a State to levy taxes beyond its border.”87
This case makes clear the rule that a state lacks the power to tax a trustee when
the state lacked in personam jurisdiction over the trustee and lacked in rem jurisdiction
over the trust property.

There was no other contact with such state and the mere

residency of the beneficiary and settlor were not deemed to be contacts of the nonresident
trustee.88
The court cites Mercantile Safe Deposit & Trust Co. for the proposition that:
“the imposition of a tax in the State in which the
beneficiaries of a trust reside, on securities in the
possession of the trustee in another State, to the control or
possession of which the beneficiaries have no present right,
is in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 89
84

Id. at 490. But, c.f. infra, Note 122 and accompanying text (discussing District of Columbia v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 689 A.2d 539 (D.C. 1997).
85

The Grantor’s wife, a New York resident, succeeded him as income beneficiary, but income distributions
by the Maryland trustee to the wife were merely discretionary. The Trustee was domiciled in Maryland,
where the trust, being a non-testamentary, inter vivos trust, was administered, and the assets were in the
trustee’s possession. When the grantor died, his will was probated in New York. Mercantile-Safe Deposit
& Trust Co., 203 N.E. 2d. at 490.
86

Id. at 491

87

Id.

88

Id.

89

Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 203 N.E.2d at 490.
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At this point in the historical review, it is clear that residence of the settlor and/or
beneficiary in a state does not cause such state to have either in rem or in personam
jurisdiction over trust property or the trustee. Indeed, residence of the settlor and/or the
beneficiary is wholly irrelevant in establishing jurisdiction90 as to the nonresident trustee
or trust property.91
In Pennoyer v. Taxation Division Director,92 a New Jersey domiciliary’s will
created a testamentary trust.93 The trustee designated by the will was a resident of New
York, assets were maintained in New York94, and the beneficiaries were not residents of
New Jersey.95 Taxes were assessed against the trustee by New Jersey. The New Jersey
Tax Director claimed the availability of New Jersey courts and the creation of the trust
relationship through probate96 of decedent’s will in New Jersey were sufficient to uphold
the tax.97

90

Reference to in personam jurisdiction over the trustee is only as to matters pertaining to the particular
trust relationship at issue. See infra, discussion of Shaffer at Note 221, et seq. and accompanying text.

91

Residence of the settlor is only relevant if, due to default in planning, law of the state of residence
governs the trust. Infra, Note 104.

92

Pennoyer v. Taxation Division Director, 5 N.J. Tax 386 (N.J. Tax Ct. 1983).

93

Id. at 390.

94

Id. at 391.

95

Id. at 390-91. Also, see supra, Note 45.

96

Probate merely affected the transfer of testator's property to the trustee. Creation and governance of the
trust occurs under laws designated in the instrument itself, i.e. New York, not New Jersey. See supra, Note
44.

97

Id. at 392.
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The opinion98 discussed several state court cases that had addressed the
question.99 The court stated that the protection and control a state exercises over property
could give a state the right to tax the income of that property.100 Ultimately, the court
held, “[t]he creation of the trust in 1971 through the probate process in New Jersey courts
is an [sic] historical fact which, absent continuing contacts, is not a constitutional nexus
justifying income taxation of undistributed income earned in 1979-80.”101
Based on Pennoyer,

102

a state cannot tax a trustee based solely on historical

contacts technically established through transfer of property by a resident to a
nonresident.103 The trust must actually be created and administered under New Jersey
law and must continue to receive significant benefits under New Jersey law. Compare
this holding with District of Columbia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, which upheld in
personam jurisdiction over the trustee when the resident decedent’s will did not designate

98

The court’s opinion noted that the United States Supreme Court had not addressed the issue of taxability
of a trust on undistributed trust income. Id. at 393. But see supra, Note 89.

99

Id. at 393. The court discusses Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia, 305 U.S. 19 (1938); Safe-Deposit & Trust
Co. v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83 (1929); Bayfield County v. Pishon, 156 N.W. 463 (Wis. 1916); and Taylor v.
State Tax Comm’n, 445 N.Y.S.2d 648 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
100

In rem jurisdiction. However, trust property was held in New York by the New York trustees. Pennoyer,
5 N.J. Tax at 397.
101

Lack of in personam jurisdiction over the trustee. Id. at 397 - 398. “Since the trust in not administered
in New Jersey and the trustee, trust assets and beneficiaries are not located in New Jersey, the only contact
between this trust and New Jersey is the fact that the grantor was domiciled here, letters were issued here,
the trustee is amenable to service of process here, and the courts are available to resolve disputes relating to
the trust.” [Emphasis added.]
102

Supra, Note 92.

103

Again, a state's statute of wills merely controls effectiveness of the transfer of a decedent/resident's
property into the trust. If the will designates a foreign trustee, foreign administration, and foreign
applicable law, such foreign law establishes and controls the fiduciary relationship. See supra, Note 44. If
New Jersey law provided for a lifetime transfer of a resident’s personal property to an out of state
transferee, such transferee, whether a trustee or otherwise, does not become subject to in personam
jurisdiction in New Jersey, nor does New Jersey have in rem jurisdiction because of the transfer.
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foreign applicable law or foreign administration. D.C. law and D.C. administration
applied to the nonresident trustee’s trust relationship in the absence of such a
designation.104
Thus, in Mercantile, Pennoyer, and Potter,105 state courts in New York and New
Jersey had ruled that domicile of a trust’s settlor, standing alone, was an insufficient basis
for a state to have in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident trustee or in rem
jurisdiction over all trust assets. In Mercantile, the added presence of the trust’s sole
beneficiary failed to establish in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident trustee when
trust property,106 applicable trust law, and trust administration were all elsewhere. It was
clear from this line of cases that domicile of the settlor and of the beneficiary was not
sufficiently related to production of trust income or to contacts of the trustee to permit
taxation of the nonresident trustee and property. In Pennoyer, it was held that mere
probation of a resident’s will did not create in personam or in rem jurisdiction in
decedent’s state of residence.

104

Infra, Note 147, et. seq. and accompanying text. In Potter v. Taxation Division Director, 5 N.J. Tax
399 (N.J. Tax Ct. 1983), a New Jersey resident created an inter vivos trust. The trust instrument designated
New York law to govern trust administration. All trust assets and trustees were located outside New
Jersey. The trust was designed as a “pour-over” trust, which would receive assets as a beneficiary under
the settlor’s will. Although New Jersey law applied to effectiveness of the will's transfer of property to the
trust, New York law applied to the trust relationship itself. Following the settlor’s death, New Jersey
claimed it had sufficient contacts to impose a tax on the New York trustee based on the fact that the settlor
was domiciled in New Jersey at the time of the trust’s creation and at the time of the settlor’s death. The
court held that the contacts between New Jersey and the inter vivos trust were even less than those argued
in Pennoyer. Indeed, the existing pour-over trust, previously established as an inter vivos trust and not as a
testamentary trust funded through New Jersey probate, was no different than any other beneficiary under
decedent’s will. The Potter court relied on the reasoning of Pennoyer in disallowing the tax. Again, this
opinion is distinguished from District of Columbia v Chase (See infra, Note 143) in which resident state
law applied to the trust. The distinction between inter vivos and testamentary trusts should be irrelevant.
105

See supra, Notes 89, 92, and 104.

106

Presence of trust property should only be relevant as to in rem jurisdiction over such property and
income therefrom. Location of property is irrelevant in establishing in personam jurisdiction over its
owner, whether the owner is considered to be the trustee or the “trust” as an abstract relationship.
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In, Swift v. Director of Revenue,107 Missouri courts considered what more was
required than settlor/decedent’s domicile.

Missouri sought to impose a tax on

testamentary trusts created by will of a Missouri resident. The trustees, trust property,
beneficiaries, and the trust administration were all outside Missouri.
The court held that the trusts108were not afforded any protection or benefit under
Missouri law that constituted sufficient nexus to uphold the tax. The tax levy failed the
Due Process test of the Fourteenth Amendment.109 The Swift court’s holding follows the
holdings in Mercantile, Pennoyer, Potter, and Taylor.110 However, the opinion then
suggested “relevant” factors to be used to guide the decision-making process in the
future. The court considered the following six factors to be relevant in determining
whether a sufficient nexus existed to support general in personam jurisdiction over the
trustee as a Missouri resident111:
(1) [T]he domicile of the settlor, (2) the state in which the trust is created,
i.e. applicable state law, (3) the location of trust property, (4) the domicile
of the beneficiaries, (5) the domicile of the trustees, and (6) the location of
the administration of the trust. For purposes of supporting an income tax,
the first two of these factors require the ongoing protection or benefit of
state law only to the extent that one or more of the other four factors is
present.112

107

Swift v. Director of Revenue, 727 S.W.2d 880 (Mo. 1987) (en banc).

108

Again, the issue should be whether the nonresident trustee knowingly directed its activities at Missouri,
e.g. knowingly became trustee of a trust relationship established and administered under Missouri law.

109

Id.

110

Respectively, supra Notes 83 through 106, and infra Note 204.

111

Residency solely as to the trust relationship at issue. Even as a nonresident, the trustee would be taxed
on income from property in Missouri as Missouri source income.

112

Id. at 882.
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However, it is the thesis of this article that some of these factors are relevant and some
are not. Contact number 3, the location of trust property, applies only to the questions of
in rem jurisdiction on a property by property analysis. Contact number 2 (law governing
trust creation and operation), 5 (domicile of trustee), and 6 (location of trust
administration) are the only factors relevant to the issue of in personam jurisdiction over
the trustee. Contacts 1 (settlor domicile) and 2 (beneficiary domicile) are only relevant as
to a state’s taxation of the settlor or the beneficiary.113
The Swift rationale and pronouncement of relevant factors to provide guidelines
for the essential “more” for in personam jurisdiction has become widely
accepted.114Nevertheless, this article suggests that its listed factors should not have
included residence of the settlor or the beneficiary.
The issue in Westfall v. Director of Revenue115 was whether a tax may be imposed
on all of a resident trust’s income when only part of the income was produced from
property actually located in the state.116 The settlor was domiciled in Missouri at the time
of his death, his will was admitted to probate in Missouri,117 and the trust was subject to

113

See supra, Note 98.

114

Bradley E.S. Fogel, What Have You Done For Me Lately, 32 URMDLR 165, at 206 M. Read Moore,
Amy L. Silliman, State Income Taxation of Trust: New Case Creates Uncertainty, 24 Est. Pln. 200 (June,
1997).
115

Westfall v. Director of Revenue, 804 S.W.2d 27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990), aff’d, 812 S.W.2d 513 (Mo.
1991).
116

Id. at 28. Also see infra Taylor, Note 204.

117

Wills are always admitted to probate in the state of decedent's domicile. Again, probate merely effects
the transfer of property into the trust, but, if the decedent so directs, the trust can be created under the laws
of a different state. Probate does not equate to trust creation. A trust is created under applicable laws
designated by its Settlor and in the absence of designation, domicile state laws apply.
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Missouri law and administration.118 No income was distributed to Missouri residents, no
trustees were residents of Missouri, and no legal proceedings took place in Missouri on
behalf of the trustee or the beneficiaries.119
Under the Missouri statute, the entire income of the trustee could be taxed, and
credits were available to resident trustees for taxes paid to other states.120 No credit was
given, however, because the trustee did not pay tax to any other state.121 The court looked
to the six factors stated in Swift to determine the validity of the tax.122 The trustee tried to
distinguish Swift, but the court, based on Missouri contacts, held the tax valid.123 Westfall
is consistent with and follows Mercantile, Pennoyer, Potter, Taylor and Swift.
Again, this article’s thesis is in full accord with the result, but not the full
rationale, of Swift124.

Location of property in a state clearly establishes in rem

jurisdiction over the income derived from such property. Location of property has little
or nothing to do with in personam jurisdiction over the trustee, however. As in Chase125,
the trust relationship, by default, was created under Missouri law and administered in
118

Id. Note that the last two factors could have been changed if the trust instrument had designated
applicable law of a different state and a different location for trust administration. See infra, Note 143 re
Chase.

119

Id. at 28-29.

120

Id. at 29. The tax credit would have avoided double taxation and resulted in proper allocation of the tax
burden, as required by the Commerce Clause. See infra, Note 195.

121

Id.

122

Id. at 29-30. See Swift v. Director of Revenue, 727 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Mo. 1987) (en banc). Swift is
discussed supra at Notes 96 through 101 and accompanying text.
123

Westfall, 804 S.W.2d at 30.

124

Supra, Note 96.

125

Infra, Note 147.
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Missouri. Therefore, the trustee knowingly accepted its obligations under and subject to
Missouri law.
In Blue v. Department of Treasury126, a Michigan resident created a revocable
inter vivos trust.127

The trustee was a Florida resident, the trust was formed and

administered under Florida law, and the trust assets were located in Florida, except for
one piece of real estate, which was located in Michigan.128 The Michigan real estate did
not produce income. The income beneficiary was a Florida resident. Since the settlor
was a resident of Michigan, Michigan’s “founder” trustee rules treated the trust as a
Michigan resident based solely on domicile of the settlor. Michigan assessed taxes on
income from trust property accumulated by the trust between 1982 and 1987.
The trial court held the tax invalid under the Due Process Clause.129 On appeal,
the Michigan Department of Treasury claimed that sufficient nexus existed to support
taxation because the trust received the protection and benefits of Michigan laws.130 The
Michigan Court of Appeals, in disallowing the tax, stated:
The state cannot create hypothetical legal protections through a
classification scheme whose validity is constitutionally suspect and
attempt to support the constitutionality of the statute by these hypothetical
legal protections. We analogize the present case to a hypothetical statute
authorizing that any person born in Michigan to resident parents is deemed
a resident and taxable as such, no matter where they reside or earn their

126

Blue v. Dep’t of Treasury, 462 N.W.2d 762 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).

127

Id. at 763.

128

Id.

129

Id.

130

Id. at 764. Note that the Settlor received the benefits of Michigan law, but not the trustee.
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income. We believe this would be clearly outside of the state’s power to
impose taxes.131
The court followed Swift and Mercantile-Safe Deposit in holding the tax invalid under the
Due Process Clause.132
Blue clearly supports the thesis of this article. The Michigan property was clearly
subject to the in rem jurisdiction of the State of Michigan. The property produced no
income, however, and its presence established no basis whatsoever for in personam
jurisdiction over the Florida trustee. The trust relationship, knowingly accepted by the
Florida trustee, was created and administered under Florida law.133

IV.

Summary of Pre-Quill Precedent
Certain broad pre-Quill principles were clear. States could tax their own residents
on their worldwide income.134 Just as clearly, states could not impose taxes, i.e. lacked in
rem or general in personam jurisdiction on income or persons beyond their borders, but
could tax income sourced from property within the taxing state. However, as usual, the
devil is in the details.

131

Id. at 764-65. [Emphasis added] The suspect classification scheme was the treatment of a "Founder
Trust", i.e., a trust created by a Michigan resident, as a "resident trust" taxable in Michigan on it is
worldwide income. The same scheme was present in New York law (See supra, Note 83) and was also
held unconstitutional.

132

Id. at 764.

133

One author argues that Blue and Westfall are “inconsistent” because Blue, too, technically meets the first
three Swift factors. The major distinction that can be made of Blue is that the Michigan property of the
trust was non-income producing. The Blue court was fair in its decision and justified in using the strong
language quoted, supra, to admonish states for finding “hypothetical legal protections” and
“constitutionally suspect” classifications for imposing a tax. Blue, 462 N.W.2d at 762.
134

See supra, Note 70; also Cook v. Tait, at 265 U.S. 47, 55 (1924) (stating, “the native citizen who is taxed
may have domicile, and the property from which his income is derived may have situs, in a foreign country
and the tax be legal-- the government having power to impose the tax”).
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In Mercantile, Blue, Pennoyer and Potter,135 New York, Missouri, and New
Jersey all held that mere residency of a settlor, i.e., a Founder Trust, was an insufficient
basis for a state to impose general in personam jurisdiction over and tax a nonresident,
inter vivos trustee.136 In Mercantile, the residency of the income beneficiary in New
York, in addition to the Settlor’s residency failed to uphold New York’s attempt to tax
the out-of-state trustee on undistributed trust income held for the benefit of New York
residents.137
The rulings in Pennoyer, Mercantile, Swift, Blue, Westfall, Taylor and Potter are
well-established and well-reasoned. First, they appropriately reflect the legal distinction
between the trustee and the settlor and/or beneficiaries as separate legal persons.
Standing alone, residence of the settlor was clearly found to provide insufficient nexus
for taxation of a nonresident trustee.138
The state of the settlor’s domicile could, under various theories, tax the resident
settlor on trust income. Grantor trust rules139 are a clear example of income tax theories
under which a resident settlor can be taxed on a foreign trust’s accumulated income. But

135

Chase Manhattan Bank v. Gavin, 733 A.2d 782 (Conn. 1999), refused to follow these cases.

136

The nexus was insufficient to treat the inter vivos trustee as a “resident.” As a nonresident, the trustee
could still be taxed on income sourced within the state or as the result of the trustee being subject to general
in personam jurisdiction.

137

Distributed income could, of course, have been taxed by New York to its resident income beneficiary.
Even income initially accumulated within the trust could have been taxed by New York to its resident
beneficiary when ultimately distributed. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Franchise Tax Bd., 390 P.2d 412, 414-15
(Cal. 1964).

138

See Bernard E. Jacob, An Extended Presence, Interstate Style: First Notes on a Theme from Saenz, 30
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1133 (2002), for a critical scholarly analysis of “Founder-State Trusts.”
139

I.R.C. §§ 671-679 (West 2002). In particular, see § 679, which applies grantor trust rules to foreign
(non-U.S.) trusts with U.S. beneficiaries.
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residence of the settlor will not provide nexus to allow taxation of a nonresident trustee or
claim the trustee is a resident of the taxing state.
Likewise, domicile of a trust’s beneficiary clearly establishes a state’s nexus to
tax the beneficiary but provides no basis whatsoever for taxation of the legally distinct
trustee. Beneficiaries can, of course, be taxed upon distributed income or even on
accumulated trust income when distributed at a future date.140

Taxation of the

beneficiary on accumulated trust income before ultimate distribution would be more an
issue of realization than of nexus.141
Mere domicile of the settlor and/or the beneficiary should provide no nexus for
treating the trustee as a resident or subject to in personam jurisdiction as to the trust
relationship. Obviously, the trustee is a legal person separate and distinct from the settlor
and/or beneficiary.

The trustee must have created nexus through its own contacts

directed at the taxing state.142 A resident settlor’s establishment of a foreign inter vivos
trust, i.e., applicable foreign law, foreign administration, and foreign trustee, provides no
nexus between the foreign trustee and settlor’s state of residence.143 Establishment of a
similar foreign144 testamentary trust also provides no nexus with the foreign trustee.

140

See discussion of Simmon, supra Note 73, and accompanying text. See also, discussion of McCulloch v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 390 P.2d 412 (Cal. 1964), infra Part IX and federal throwback rules, discussed infra,
Note 246
141

See infra, Note 78 and accompanying text.

142

The fiduciary must itself have directed relevant activities at the taxing state as required by Quill. See
infra, 160 and 185.

143

In D.C. v Chase, infra Note 147, D.C. law and D.C. administration were, by default, applicable law to
the trust, even though trustee, trust assets and beneficiaries were outside of D.C.
144

The term “Foreign” meaning applicable foreign law, foreign administration, and a foreign trustee.
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Relevant factors affecting in personam jurisdiction over the trustee as to the trust
relationship include only: (1) the trust relationship is governed by state law145; (2) a
trustee lives in the state; or (3) the trust is administered in the state.146

Situs of property

is only relevant as to in rem jurisdiction and is not relevant to establish in personam
jurisdiction over the trustee. Residency of the settlor or beneficiary is not relevant
factors.
In District of Columbia v. Chase Manhattan Bank,147 a post-Quill case, a D.C. tax
on a foreign trustee was upheld. The trust relationship was established by the will of a
resident of D.C., subject to D.C. law, and administered in D.C.148 The opinion noted that
a trust “created” under D.C. law and with D.C. administration, much like a domestic
corporation, was a creature of the law of its state of organization.149

145

In Swift, this factor is confusingly described as “the state in which the trust is created.” This
terminology confuses the issue of probate and compliance with a state’s statute of wills [wholly irrelevant
factors] on one hand, and the law which governs establishment and operation of the trust relationship on the
other.

146

IDAHO ADMIN. CODE 35.1.1.35 (2003). See Income Taxation of Trust Income: Idaho Law, Practical
Drafting 6618-6619 (October, 2001).
147

District of Columbia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 689 A.2d 539 (D.C. 1997).

148

Professor Roger John Traynor had predicted taxation of testamentary trusts on this basis many years ago
in his classic article on trust taxation. See Roger John Traynor, State Taxation of Trust Income, 22 IOWA L.
REV. 268 (1937) (discussed infra Part VIII).
149

Chase Manhattan Bank, 689 A.2d at 544. The will did not designate foreign applicable law or foreign
administration, so, by default, D.C. law applied. See supra, Note 44. The opinion refused to extend its
holding to an inter vivos trust established by a D.C. resident as follows:
We express no opinion as to the constitutionality of taxing the entire net income of inter vivos trusts based
solely on the fact that the settlor was domiciled in the District when she died and the trust therefore became
irrevocable. In such cases, the nexus between the trust and the District is arguably more attenuated, since
the trust was not created by probate of the decedent's will in the District's courts. An irrevocable inter vivos
trust does not owe its existence to the laws and courts of the District in the same way that the testamentary
trust at issue in the present case does, and thus it does not have the same permanent tie to the District. In
some cases the District courts may not even have principle supervisory authority over such an inter vivos
trust. The idea of fundamental fairness, which under girds our due process analysis, therefore may or may
not compel a different result in an inter vivos trust context. (Emphasis added). Everything the court stated
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The Chase opinion’s finding of sufficient nexus was based on the specific facts of
that case. Despite dictum150, nexus was not based on mere residency of the decedent in
the District. Neither was nexus founded on mere probate of decedent’s will in the
District. Nexus was based on the trust relationship being administered in the District
under District laws. Decedent had not designated administration or laws of another
jurisdiction. The foreign trustee accepted its duties subject to such conditions.
Other than the unprecedented holding in Gavin, none of these cases found due
process nexus based solely on the residence of the settlor and/or beneficiary in the taxing
state.
V.

Quill Corp. v. North Dakota151
Quill Corporation conducted a mail order business throughout the United States.
Although Quill was not a resident of North Dakota and had no physical presence in the
state, i.e., no warehouse, office, etc., it did make catalogue sales of products into North
Dakota.152 The United States Supreme Court addressed the validity of the North Dakota
use tax on a nonresident under both the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause of
the U. S. Constitution.153

as to an inter vivos trust is equally applicable to a testamentary trust when the will designates foreign law
and foreign administration.
Id. at 547 n.11. Again, in the "present case" the will failed to invoke foreign law or foreign administration.
150

Id.

151

See supra, Note 1.

152

153

Id. at 302.
Id. at 305.
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In addressing North Dakota’s ability to tax Quill’s North Dakota activities154
within due process limits, the Court noted that the Due Process Clause required: (1)
“some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and a person, property or
transaction it seeks to tax,”155 and (2) “that the income attributed to the State for tax
purposes must be rationally related to values connected with the taxing State.”156 The
North Dakota tax being levied in this case was a use tax. Relying on International Shoe
Company v. Washington157 and its progeny, the Court stated, “we have framed the
relevant inquiry as whether a defendant had minimum contacts with the jurisdiction ‘such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.’”158
The Court continued its analysis and held that due process could be satisfied even
if a taxpayer had no physical presence within the taxing state.159

Regarding the

imposition of a sales/use tax, the Court held that such reasoning “justifies the imposition
of the collection duty on a mail order house that is engaged in continuous and widespread
solicitation of business within a state. Such a corporation clearly has ‘fair warning that

154

North Dakota never attempted to tax Quill as a “resident.”

155

Id. (quoting Miller Bros. Co. v Md., 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954)).

156

Id. (quoting Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Blair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978)). Quill was clearly being taxed as a
nonresident. The North Dakota tax would only be imposed on Quill's North Dakota sales. Quill would not
be subject as a resident taxpayer to general taxation by North Dakota on all its sales. Id. at 303.
157

Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1945).

158

Quill, 504 U.S. at 307 (citations omitted).

159

Id. at 308.
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[its] activity may subject [it] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.’”160 Thus, North
Dakota’s sales/use tax levy was held to satisfy the Court’s due process standard.
Analysis of the negative sweep of the Commerce Clause, i.e., those aspects of
state activity prohibited because they may unduly interfere with interstate commerce,
ultimately led to a determination that the sales/use tax could not be imposed by North
Dakota.

The Court analyzed the negative impact of state taxation on interstate

commerce. The Court then noted that it had “adopted a ‘multiple-taxation doctrine’ that
focused not on whether a tax was ‘direct’ or ‘indirect,’ but rather on whether a tax
subjected interstate commerce to “a risk of multiple taxation.”161
The Court ultimately held that it would apply the four-part test which it first
established in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady162 to the Commerce Clause
question.163 The Court stated that “under Complete Auto’s four-part test we will sustain a
tax against a Commerce Clause challenge so long as the ‘tax [1] is applied to an activity
with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not
discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services provided
by the State.’”164
Again, this test was being applied to the allocable, i.e. North Dakota source, sales
of a nonresident. Neither Complete Auto nor Quill dealt with classification and taxation
160

Id. (alterations in original), quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) discussed infra at Note
218, et seq. and accompanying text.

161

Id. at 309 (emphasis added).

162

Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).

163

Quill, 504 U.S. at 310.

164

Id. at 311 (citation omitted) [emphasis added.].
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of a resident on its worldwide income. Even if state law denominates or classifies a trust
as being a “resident trust”, imposition of a tax on the trustee must not violate due process
or the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution.165
At least in the context of sales/use taxes and the mail order business, the Court
reaffirmed the continued applicability of the bright line presence test set forth in National
Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue166 as applied to factor [1] of Complete Auto‘s
four-part Commerce Clause test.167 The Court was also emphatic that the due process
“minimum contacts” test required much less than the “substantial nexus” test of the
Commerce Clause, stating, “[a] tax may be consistent with due process and yet unduly
burden interstate commerce.”168 The Court held that the first and fourth prongs of the
Complete Auto test “require a substantial nexus and a relationship between the tax and
state-provided services,” to ensure that state taxation does not unduly burden interstate
commerce.169
VI. Are State Benefits Afforded a Beneficiary Attributable to a Nonresident Trustee for
Due Process Purposes?
A.

Gavin
165

See supra, Note 135 and Blue re "constitutionally suspect classifications".

166

Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967).

167

Quill, 504 U.S. at 317 (stating, “the continuing value of a bright-line rule in this area and the doctrine
and principles of stare decisis indicate that the Bellas Hess rule remains good law”). The Bellas Hess test
remains good, at least as applied to state sales and use taxes and the mail order business, but the Supreme
Court also stated that “the bright-line rule of Bellas Hess furthers the ends of the dormant Commerce
Clause.” Id. at 314.
168

Id. at 313 n.7.

169

The [p]urpose of the Commerce Clause is to insure a national economy free from unjustifiable local
entanglement. . ." National Bellas Hess, supra, Note 166. Realize that the first and fourth prongs of this
test address the same two issues as due process analysis, i.e. (1) sufficiency of nexus, and (2) relationship
between state tax and state benefits provided. See supra, Note 156.
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The facts of Gavin were summarized in the Introduction to this article.
Connecticut taxed a New York trustee based on claimed in personam jurisdiction as to
the trust relationship. The trustee had no Connecticut contacts, trust property was in New
York, trust administration was in New York, and New York law governed the creation
and enforcement of the trust relationship.170
The Gavin opinion justified its taxation of the foreign trustee of the single inter
vivos trust by citing benefits Connecticut law provided to the trust’s Connecticut
beneficiary.171 Based on this analysis, Connecticut would tax, and claim compliance with
due process, any estate or trust, whether testamentary or inter vivos,172 established by
even a nonresident settlor, if such estate or trust had a Connecticut beneficiary.173 The
following benefits to the Gavin beneficiary cited by the opinion would apply equally to a
Connecticut beneficiary of any nonresident estate or trust, whether or not established by a
Connecticut settlor:
In the present case, the critical link to the undistributed income sought to
be taxed is the fact that the non-contingent beneficiary of the inter vivos
trust during the tax year in question was a Connecticut domiciliary. The
accumulated income eventually will be paid . . . to her . . . [or] to her then
living descendants. Thus . . . she enjoyed all the protections and benefits
afforded to other domiciliaries. Her right to the eventual receipt and
enjoyment of the accumulated income was . . . protected by the laws of the
170

See supra, Note 9

171

Id. at 803. Minimum contacts were deemed satisfied by “the presence in the state of a noncontingent
beneficiary who receives the benefits and protections of the state's laws.”
172

Regarding inter vivos trusts, the Gavin court stated “[a]lthough this is a closer case than that with respect
to the testamentary trusts, we conclude that the state's taxation scheme of the undistributed income of the
inter vivos trust satisfies the due process clause.”

173

Although the settlor in Gavin was a Connecticut resident when the inter vivos trust was established, that
was not, and could not have been, the basis for finding minimum contacts for due process purposes. See
infra, Note 174.
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state. We conclude that . . . a state may . . . tax the income of an inter
vivos trust that is accumulated for the ultimate benefit of a non-contingent
domiciliary...174
Connecticut law benefited its resident beneficiary. If the beneficiary’s noncontingent
status satisfied the “realization” requirement for “income,” Connecticut could clearly tax
its beneficiary.175 The Gavin opinion, however, improperly attributed such benefits to the
New York trustee for purposes of due process. Again, the New York trustee had no
contacts with Connecticut and derived no benefits from Connecticut law.176 Once this
attribution from beneficiary to trustee is allowed to occur, there is the potential for
endless reattribution of state law benefits, i.e., why stop with mere single attribution?
This rationale would and did turn due process on its head in the context of Gavin: "Where
there is jurisdiction neither as to person nor property, the imposition of a tax would be
ultra vires and void." 177
Could shareholder domicile states tax nonresident corporations that have no
business or other contact with such state, or vice versa, as a result of attribution of state
law benefits from a resident shareholder to such corporation? We know the answer to
this rhetorical question—it is clearly No!178

174

Id. at 802 (emphasis added). See discussion infra, Note 218.

175

See discussion of Simmon and Glenshaw Glass, supra, Note 73.

176

See supra, Notes 9 - 13 and accompanying text.

177

Miller Bros. Co. v. State of Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 341 citing City of St. Louis v. Wiggins Family Co.,
II Wall. 42S430.
178

See infra, Note 180.
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In Canon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co,179 the Supreme Court first
held that corporate contacts cannot be attributed to shareholders of the corporation and
vice versa.180 This principle has clearly been extended to a limited partnership and
attribution of its contacts to limited partners.181 If general partners are agents acting on
behalf of their partnership, contacts of the general partner can be attributed to the
partnership. This is solely because the partner’s actions as agent are actions of the
partnership.182 However, beneficiaries, as such, are not agents of the trustee. Clearly, the
beneficiary and the trustee are distinct legal persons.183
In Quill, the Supreme Court looked to the Taxpayer’s direct contacts with, and
benefits derived from, North Dakota. Indirect benefits of North Dakota law to Quill’s
North Dakota customers or vendors which might be attributed to Quill were not even
analyzed by the Court184. To establish “minimum contacts” for due process, the Supreme
Court noted that “Quill” itself had mailed 24 tons of sales catalogs into the state and had
itself made sales there of approximately $1 million. As a result, Quill itself was found to
have “purposefully directed its activities at North Dakota…”185 Quill was not and could

179

Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925).

180

A subsidiary corporation's operations in North Carolina failed to establish due process nexus between
North Carolina and the subsidiaries' parent corporation, i.e. its shareholder. Separateness of the subsidiary
was not a “pure fiction” and was respected. Id. at 337.

181

Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1990).

182

Id. at 1366. For a well-reasoned analysis of the fallacies of nexus attribution, see Lowery and Vasquez,
“When Is It Unconstitutional For States To Tax Nonresident Members of Limited Liability Companies?”
State Tax Notes, May 19, 2003, at 633.
183

See supra, Notes 28, et. seq. and accompanying text.

184

See infra, Note 186.

185

Quill, 504 U.S. at 308.
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not be subjected to tax merely because North Dakota law applied to and benefited Quill’s
customers or vendors and thereby indirectly benefited Quill. Such state benefits were not
and could not be attributed to Quill.186
B.

Gavin’s Treatment of Trust Relationships as Forever Establishing Tax Jurisdiction
Over the Trustee when Trustees, Trust Property, Trust Administration, and
Applicable Trust Law were all Outside of Connecticut.
State taxation of a trustee, whether the trust relationship was testamentary or inter
vivos, must pass both the due process and commerce clause requirements established
under Quill. Even if the settlor resided in the taxing state, tax policies which create a risk
of multiple taxation nevertheless discriminate against interstate commerce and are
unconstitutional.187
The Gavin opinion clearly recognized that taxation of a trustee when the trust
relationship was actually established, governed, and administered under the taxing state’s
applicable law was easily justified.188
Taxation of the trustee of an inter vivos trust relationship established, governed,
and administered outside the taxing state under laws of a foreign jurisdiction can hardly
be justified on the same principles however.189

Likewise, testamentary trust

relationships, like inter vivos trust relationships, can clearly be established, administered,

186

Quill, citing Bellas Hess, focused on the taxpayer’s direct contacts with its North Dakota customers, not
the mere fact that taxpayer had customers in the state. Id. at 313. Indeed, the North Dakota Supreme Court
relied on similar, Gavin-like, general economic benefits and economic climate provided by its laws, Id. at
304, but was reversed by the Supreme Court.
187

See Part B.3. below.

188

Gavin, at 200, citing District of Columbia v. Chase Manhattan Bank.

189

See supra, Note 149.
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and subject to laws of a foreign jurisdiction.190 Such testamentary trust relationships have
no more contact with the jurisdiction of the Decedent’s domicile than a similar inter vivos
trust relationship.191
VII.

Gavin’s Failed Commerce Clause Analysis
As stated in Quill192 and Complete Auto,193 a state tax will be sustained under a
Commerce Clause challenge194 only so long as the tax (1) is applied to an activity with
substantial nexus with the taxing state, (2) is fairly apportioned, (3) does not discriminate
against interstate commerce, and (4) is fairly related to services provided by the state.195

1. Substantial Nexus: Substantial nexus requires more than “minimum contacts”,
“slightest presence”, or “minimal nexus” under due process.196 In Gavin, out-of-state
banks, as trustees, had to have “a substantial nexus” with Connecticut in order for
Connecticut to levy an income tax on such out-of-state trustees197. Yet, except in its due
190

By default, i.e. by failure of the instrument to designate foreign law and foreign administration, District
laws applied to the creation and administration of the trust in Chase. See Notes 147 and 149.

191

See supra Notes 40 - 46 and discussion of Shaffer, infra, Note 218. et seq.

192

See supra Notes 149 - 151 and accompanying text.

193

See supra Note 139 and accompanying text.

194

The Commerce Clause's negative sweep is the source of limitations on a state's power to tax interstate
transactions. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 309 (stating, “[the Court’s] interpretation of the ‘negative’ or ‘dormant’
Commerce Clause has evolved substantially over the years, particularly as that Clause concerns limitations
on state taxation powers”).
195

Id. at 311 (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 430 U.S. at 279).

196

Id. at 315 n.8.

197

Only legal persons can have nexus, i.e. can direct their activities at the taxing state. Trusts are not legal
persons. Trusts are merely abstract relationships between persons. See supra, Note 30 et. seq. and
accompanying text.
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process analysis, Gavin makes no analysis whatsoever as to sufficiency of the out-of-state
bank’s contacts as a trustee with the State of Connecticut. As previously discussed198, the
trustee’s contacts with Connecticut even failed the minimal due process nexus
requirement.
The Gavin opinion merely suggests that the out-of-state bank fails to address the
four separate aspects of the Commerce Clause test.199

The opinion itself merely

addressed whether risk of multiple taxation would unconstitutionally impact selection of
out-of-state trustees as contrasted with domestic trustees not subject to such risk?200
2. Fair Apportionment. Fair apportionment of the tax among states involved in
the taxed activity is also required.201 As stated by the dissent in Gavin, Connecticut’s
income tax is not apportioned at all.202

There was no tax credit available from

Connecticut for the trustees’ taxes paid to New York.203 Apportionment requires a
rational and measured fragmenting of the transaction or tax base so that each state taxes

198

See supra, Notes 185 and 186.

199

Gavin, 733 A.2d at 805.

200

See infra, Note 204.

201

Quill, 504 U.S. at 311 (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)).

202

Gavin, 733 A.2d at 808. The trusts were all treated as “resident” trusts under Gavin, and residents are
taxed on all income without allocation. Connecticut did not even allow tax credits. Id. at 786.
203

Id. at 804. The trustee and trust property were in New York and New York law applied to trust
administration. The inter vivos trust was formed under New York law. Also, see supra, Note 116 et. seq.
and accompanying text.
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only that part of the whole activity or base most closely related to such state.204 Gavin
taxed all of the trustee’s income, not merely some apportioned part.
Trust assets, administration, applicable laws, and trustees were all outside of
Connecticut. Nevertheless, the trustee was treated as a “resident” in Gavin, i.e. taxed on
all their income, irrespective of the source of such income.
Rational allocation has been attempted by many states in many ways.

The

“UDITPA” applies uniform allocation rules to all signatory states.205 Under the UDITPA
there are different allocations for business and for non-business206 income. Sales of a
business’s assets are allocated in one fashion and sale of its stock is allocated in
another.207 Also, states such as New York have their own unique allocation rules.208
Pass-through entities add another layer of complexity to the allocation confusion.

204

In Taylor v. State Tax Commission, 445 N.Y.S.2d 648 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981), a testamentary trust was
created by the will of a decedent who died while residing in New York. The trust assets included real
property in Florida. Since Florida law prohibited a foreign corporation from acting as trustee over Florida
property, decedent's sons were appointed as trustees of the Florida property. The trust excluded capital
gains from the Florida property when calculating its New York taxable income. The court held that neither
New York laws nor New York services were of benefit to the Florida property. The court stated, "[t]he fact
that the former owner of the property in question died while being domiciled in New York, making the trust
a resident trust under New York tax law, is insufficient to establish a basis for jurisdiction". Thus, new
York taxation of gain on the Florida property violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

205

Unif. Div. Of Income for Tax Purposes Act.

206

See, e.g., Ex parte Uniroyal Tire Co., 779 So. 2d 227 (Ala. 2000); Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, 504
U.S. 768 (1992).
207

Mobile Oil v. Comm’r of Taxes, 455 U.S. 425 (1980).

208

See N.Y. Tax Law §§210.3 and §§208.9.
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Overly broad209 trustee nexus and residency statutes are sometimes referred to
conservatively as Founder State Trusts. Even if a trustee were a resident, the right of
other states to tax income from sources within such other states must be recognized and
adjustments made to avoid the risk of multiple tax burdens.210
3. Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce The principle focus of the Gavin
opinion’s Commerce Clause analysis was whether or not a Connecticut “settlor would
choose a Connecticut bank, over an out-of-state bank, as trustee solely because of the
potential for future multiple taxation of some portion of the trust’s future income.”211
The appropriate test, however, was whether or not the “practical effect” of the
Connecticut tax was to “discriminate against interstate commerce.”212
As noted, supra, the Gavin opinion stated, “although we agree that there are such
incentives and risks, we conclude that they are too remote and speculative to constitute a
dormant commerce clause violation.”213 The opinion found the speculative nature in the
selection of a trustee from its belief that multiple and diverse factors214 would be

209

“The Founder-State Trust is inconsistent with the relations of states of the American Union and with the
reality, and realistic expectations, of the citizens of each state.” Bernard E. Jacob, An Extended Presence,
Interstate Style: First Notes on a Theme from Saenz, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1133, 1240 (2002).

210

See infra, Note 212..

211

Gavin, 733 A.2d at 806 (emphasis added).

212

Quill Corp. v. N.D., 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992).

213

Id. at 805. See infra, Note 214 et. seq. and accompanying text.

214

“The choice of bank as trustee is likely to be animated by many imponderables, among them: the prior
experience of the testator or settlor; the financial performance of the various banks in the pool of available
choices; the current location of the likely beneficiaries; the current location of the various banks in the pool;
and, of course, the tax implication, if any. We simply are not sufficiently persuaded of the underlying
validity of the plaintiff’s assumption about how such a multifaceted decision as the choice of a trustee is
likely to be made.” Id. at 806.
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considered by a Connecticut settlor before selecting a trustee. The Connecticut court
found that its tax imposed on a foreign trustee would indeed subject the trust income to
the risk of multiple taxation,215 a risk not shared by the domestic trustees. Thus, even if a
state tax created an undue burden on interstate commerce, the Gavin opinion would not
find a Commerce Clause violation unless it could determine the precise role such tax
played in commercial decisions of consumers of interstate products and services. Indeed,
the opinion stated that the adverse impact of the multiple taxes must be the “sole”216
determinative factor on economic decisions affecting interstate commerce. In summary,
as well-stated by one commentator:
“[I]f a state elects to attempt to tax income from trusts having contacts on
which the Connecticut Supreme Court supported its tax …there are strong
arguments to support a challenge to the enforceability of such tax.”217
4. Relation to State Benefits Provided. Shaffer v. Heitner218 was decided by the
Supreme Court in the same time frame as it decided Complete Auto.219 In Shaffer, the
Supreme Court analyzed personal jurisdiction under the International Shoe220 due process
standard.221 As part of the application of this standard, the Supreme Court also analyzed
whether the minimum contacts of a party were related to the subject matter at issue. In
215

“[B]ecause the property of all of these trusts consisted only of cash and securities in the tax year in
question, no credit would have been available to them under the current tax scheme.” Id. at 804.
216

See supra, Note 211.

217

Guiterrez, Jr., The State Income Taxation of Multi-Jurisdictional Trusts, 36 Univ. of Miami Institute on
Estate Planning §1309.2 (2002).

218

Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (June, 1977).

219

See supra, Note 162.

220

See supra, Note 157.

221

"Minimum contacts" such as do not offend traditional notions of "fair play and substantial justice". See
supra, Note 158 and Shaffer, 433 U.S., at 203 and 207.
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essence, this became a second due process requirement.

“[T]here is no necessary

relationship between holding a position as a corporate fiduciary [subject of the litigation]
and owning stock or other interest in the corporation [parties’ sole due process contact
with Delaware].222 The Supreme Court also directly rejected a state’s claim that benefits
provided through application of state laws to an issue, necessarily gave the state
jurisdiction over the parties associated with such issue.223

“The issue is personal

jurisdiction, not choice of law. It is resolved in this case by considering the acts of the
[appellants]”.224
(1) Minimum contacts, and (2) relation of such contact to the subject
matter at issue, i.e. production of income or subject matter of litigation. In
Heitner, parties had property in Delaware [thereby satisfying (1) above],
but the property was not the subject matter of the litigation in which
personal jurisdiction was sought [thereby, not satisfying (2) above].
The Appellee’s discredited argument in Shaffer was much the same as Connecticut’s in
Gavin:
“[Appellee] notes that Delaware law provides substantial benefits to
corporate officers and directors, and that . . . [it is] only fair and just to
require Appellants, in return for these benefits to respond in the State of
Delaware.”225
But the Court absolutely rejected this general “legal benefits” argument and stated “this
line of reasoning … does not demonstrate that Appellants have ‘purposefully availed

222

Shaffer, at 214.

223

Id, at 215. "[W]e have rejected the argument that if a state's law can properly be applied to a dispute, its
courts necessarily have jurisdiction over the parties to that dispute."

224

Id, (citations omitted) [Emphasis added]. Quill, likewise, ignored general benefits derived from
applicability of North Dakota law but focused instead on Quill's own acts directed at North Dakota. See
supra, Note 185.
225

Id, at 215-216
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themselves of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state.’ Hanson v.
Dencla, 357 U.S. 235, at 253.”226
In Complete Auto’s four-part test for state taxation’s compliance with the
Commerce clause, Steps One227 and Four essentially repeat this dual due process
standard. Step One requires adequate nexus.228

Step Four requires the necessary

relationship between state benefits provided and the subject of taxation.229
Gavin wrongly held that the Connecticut law benefits afforded the Connecticut
beneficiary230 subjected the nonresident trustee to Connecticut jurisdiction for due
process purposes.

This analysis was squarely rejected by the Supreme Court in

Shaffer231, whether the relationship to state services provided test is applied in the due
process context or as Step Four in the Commerce Clause analysis.232

226

Id, at 216

227

See supra, Note 168.

228

Substantial v. Minimum Contacts. See supra, Note 196.

229

See supra, Note 156.

230

See supra, Note 173. Connecticut law did not benefit the earning of the income from trust property.
Connecticut law merely protected the beneficiary’s receipt and enjoyment of income when distributed.
231

See Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v Minnesota, 358 U.s. 450, 464 – 465 (1959), (taxes are
“levied only on the portion of the taxpayer’s net income which arises from its activities within the taxing
state”).

232

“Resident" Taxpayers: Internal Consistency, due process, and State Income Taxation, 91 Colum. L. Rev.
119, 141+ (1991)
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VIII. The Importance of Roger John Traynor233 to the Analysis of both McCulloch and
Gavin
Justice Roger John Traynor was among the most influential and highly esteemed
jurists and legal scholars of the twentieth century.234 From 1928 to 1940, Professor
Traynor served as tax advisor to the California Board of Equalization where he was
responsible for complete reform of California’s sales and use tax, personal income tax,
and corporate franchise taxes. He took a leave of absence in 1937 to serve at the U.S.
Treasury Department to help Treasury draft the Revenue Act of 1938. He served as
associate justice of the California Supreme Court from 1940-1964, serving as Chief
Justice from 1964-1970.
Among his prolific writings, Professor Traynor authored the classic insightful
article, “State Taxation of Trust Income.”235

As associate justice of the California

Supreme Court, he was in the majority of the Supreme Court of California on its
McCulloch opinion. Indeed, the special California statutes236 analyzed in McCulloch

233

Professor of Law, University of California, Advisor to the California State Board of Equalization. He
“played an important role in drafting important [California] tax laws.” National Tax Association Tax
Conference, Indianapolis, Indiana, September 29, 1936 @ 157. . ..

234

In his writing and jurisprudence, he established national legal principles of product liability with strict
liability; extension of strict product liability through the distribution chain; action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress; “moderate and restrained” doctrine in conflict of laws; the fiduciary obligation owed
by majority shareholders to minority shareholders; admission of custom and practice evidence in contract
litigation; the “exclusionary rule” barring improperly obtained evidence; abolition of sovereign immunity;
no fault divorce through elimination of defense of recrimination; abolishment of laws prohibiting
miscegenation; and citation of law review articles in judicial decisions. See generally, “Roger John
Traynor”, Legal Encyclopedia, published by Thomson & Gale; West’s Encyclopedia of American Law,
The Gale Group, Inc. 1998. Answers.com 13 Mar 2006. http://www.answers.com. Also see Friendly,
“Ablest Judge of His Generation,” 71 Cal L R 1039-1044 (No. 4, July 1983); White, “Introduction” in The
Traynor Reader: A Collection of Essays by the Honorable Roger J. Traynor, ( San Francisco: The Hastings
Law Journal, Hastings College of the Law, 1987)(http://uchastings.edu/?pid=1408)
235

Roger John Traynor, State Taxation of Trust Income, 22 IOWA L. REV. 268 (1937).

236

See supra, Notes 195 - 199 and accompanying text.
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reflected in detail the views expressed by Professor Traynor in his early article dealing
with state taxation of trustees, beneficiaries, and settlor/grantors.237
Traynor’s article first analyzed settled law on state taxation of residents and
nonresidents. He discussed a state’s right to tax domestic trustees on all their accumulated
income whether earned within or without its borders.238 He also acknowledged the right
of a state to tax all income earned within its borders by nonresident trustees, thereby
resulting in two states possibly taxing the same income.239 Likewise, he discussed the
well-established right of a state to tax resident beneficiaries upon distributions of current
income.
Traynor’s article, however, then focused on how the complexity of trusts had
created obstacles to a state’s ability to tax accumulated trust income. Nonresident,
complex trusts located in states selected for minimum taxation could and were being used
to shelter income. Through accumulation of income by a nonresident trustee, the state of
the beneficiary’s residence could be prevented from taxing such income. Simmon240
237

Indeed, McCulloch cites Professor Traynor’s article in FN9. '(W)hile the complexity of the trust itself
and of the relations of the parties thereto complicates the problem of effective taxation, it should not
obstruct the claims of a state to tax trust income, so far as possible, as it income is accorded of a trust.
Trust income is accorded protection in its production, receipt and enjoyment to the same extent as other
income; it measures in like manner ability to pay. It measures in like manner ability far as possible upon
the same basis. If the obstacles interposed by the trust device are to be circumvented, jurisdiction to tax
should be found wherever substantial claims to tax are reinforced by effective power to compel payment.'
(Emphasis added.) Traynor, State Taxation of Trust Income (1937) 22 Iowa L. Rev. 268, 271- 272. Power
to collect is an essential element of tax jurisdiction.
238

Traynor, supra Note 235.

239

Id. Former §17980, renumbered today as §18005, provides a credit for trustee taxes paid to its state of
domicile, e.g. Missouri, against California taxes paid by the beneficiary on the same income. Though the
McCulloch opinion doesn’t mention availability of the credit, §18005 provides a credit to the beneficiary
for taxes the trustee paid on the same income to Missouri, thereby properly minimizing taxation of the
same income by two different states.
240

See supra, Note 73
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clearly reflected how a subsequent distribution of previously accumulated trust income
could also avoid taxation by the beneficiary’s state of residence depending on a state’s
principal and income statutes applicable to trusts.
Professor Traynor’s article explored ways in which such states could tax such
accumulated income within the bounds of due process. Clearly Traynor felt and stated
that a state’s “jurisdiction to tax should be found wherever [1] substantial claims to tax
are reinforced by [2] effective power to compel payment.”241 “Substantial claims to tax”
refers to the state’s due process nexus to the income. “Effective power to compel
payment” refers to in personam jurisdiction over the taxpayer in order to compel his tax
payment. “The power to tax is empty without the power to collect the tax; hence the
power to collect is a necessary predicate to a state’s power to tax.”242 Traynor then
analyzed the due process quandary of how to tax a foreign trustee’s accumulated income
when a taxing state lacked due process nexus with the trustee and current income was not
being distributed to its resident beneficiary..
His solution was that such a state should tax its own residents, whether settlor or
beneficiary, not the foreign trustee who lacked nexus with the taxing state.243
Traynor proposed taxing a resident settlor pursuant to Grantor trust principles,
though grantor trust laws244 were not enacted for another 20 years. Regarding beneficiary
241

See supra, 237.

242

See Lowy supra, Note 54. “Power” to collect tax, i.e. personal jurisdiction over the taxpayer, pairs the
jurisdiction to tax with in rem or in personam jurisdiction.
243

Clearly, Traynor was analyzing circumstances in which the trustee, settlor, and beneficiary lived in
different states, and trust income was accumulated, not distributed. Id at 274 (“… the various parties are
domiciled in different states”).

244

Id at 284 – 291.
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taxation, Traynor stated, “if a tax is effectively to reach such income, and thereby the
recipient’s ability to pay, it must be imposed at the domicile of the beneficiary when the
income is currently distributable.”245 Traynor was proposing a system of beneficiary
taxation upon distribution of accumulated income 20 years prior to enactment of the
federal throw back rules which were later enacted based on his tax principles.246
Traynor recognized that the state of a beneficiary’s residence was limited (1) to
taxation of its resident beneficiary, and (2) to imposing such a tax only when the income
was distributable.247 Traynor’s position is absolutely clear and diametrically opposed to
Connecticut taxing the New York trustee based solely on the domicile of the beneficiary:
The state of either the Settlor’s or the beneficiary’s domicile would
likewise have difficulty in collecting a tax from a non-resident trustee on
income which was neither produced, received nor enjoyed within its
borders during the period of accumulation . . .. 248

245

Traynor at 275, supra, Note 237. (Emphasis added). Traynor opposed taxing the entire accumulated
income to the California beneficiary solely in the year of distribution since progressive rate schedules
would impose an inappropriate tax burden on such beneficiary. Thus, following Traynor’s philosophy, the
beneficiary’s tax was calculated separately for each year of accumulation under §17745(d). See supra, Note
275.
246

“The throwback rules of §§ 665 through 668 taxed distributions of accumulated
income by a complex trust roughly as though they had been distributed to the
beneficiaries in earlier years, with credit for taxes paid by the trust when it reported the
income. The throwback rules were intended to curb use of accumulation trusts as taxavoidance devices.” Bittker and Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts, ¶
81.5.
247

Infra, Note 249

248

Id. at 288. Again “power” to collect tax is an essential element of jurisdiction to tax. Traynor
recognized there was no personal jurisdiction, i.e. no power, to collect the tax from a nonresident trustee.
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Traynor was also concerned about the validity under state law to tax the resident
beneficiary on accumulated trust income even when distributed.

249

The issue, as in

Simmon, was whether state principal and income laws permitted taxation of the
distribution as “income.” His concern was based on the trust’s accumulated income
having blended with principal and having become a nontaxable gift, bequest, or return of
capital when later distributed. 250
The foregoing concerns, along with others,251 and the analysis of Professor
Traynor were addressed and reflected in the unique California Statute252 analyzed in
McCulloch.253 As Advisor to the California State Board of Equalization,254 it is likely
Professor Traynor participated in drafting the unique California statutes modeled after his
own proposals. First, Professor Traynor’s analysis of the constitutional power “to compel
payments”255 by the state of the settlor’s and beneficiaries’ residence resulted in a tax

249

There are Constitutional “realization” issues in taxing a beneficiary prior to actual distribution, assuming
the beneficiary cannot control distribution. If the beneficiary controls distribution, constructive receipt
satisfies realization. See Glenshaw Glass, supra, Note 78.

250

“The validity of such a tax would depend largely upon the theories with regard to the nature of capital
and income. Thus, in Commissioner v. Simmon, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held invalid an income
tax regulation making accumulated income taxable to the resident beneficiary when received from a
nonresident trustee on the ground that such accumulated income constituted 'capital' and not 'income' in the
hands of the beneficiary.” Id. at 281 (footnote omitted). Simmon is discussed supra, Note 78.
251

Professor Traynor also raised the concern that taxation of a lump sum on distribution would throw
income into higher brackets than imposition of an annual tax on smaller, annual income. Id. at 280-81.
Taxing income annually, as was done in McCulloch, is required by the California statute. McCulloch v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 390 P.2d 412, 417 (Cal. 1964).

252

See infra, Note 272

253

See supra, Note 23

254

See supra Note 235 and infra, Note 283.

255

Absence of “power” to compel payment from the nonresident trustee equates to lack of in personam
jurisdiction over such nonresident trustee.
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actually imposed on a California resident beneficiary.256 Likewise, the constitutional
issue of realization257 resulted in California delaying taxation until income was actually
distributed to the resident beneficiary. The state statutory issue of capital vs. income258
was addressed by revising California’s principal and income statutes.259 Double taxation
criticism under the Commerce Clause was satisfied by allowing the beneficiary a tax
credit for taxes paid by the trustee to its state of residence.260
The discussion below reflects that Traynor’s theories were reflected and
implemented in the California statutes and in the McCulloch opinion. The opinion noted
that the tax was actually imposed on the California resident beneficiary, not the foreign
trustee. The tax was calculated on each year’s annual income, not on the accumulated
lump sum actually distributed. The beneficiary’s obligation to pay was postponed until
actual distribution. The beneficiary absolutely did not pay the tax previously levied
against the trustee.
As stated in §17745(d), “The tax attributable to the inclusion of that distributed
income in the gross income of that beneficiary for the year…had it been includable in the
gross income of the beneficiary ratably …for the period that the trust accumulated or
acquired income for that contingent beneficiary…”261

256

See supra, Note 273 and §17745, subsection (a).

257

Glenshaw Glass, supra, Note 78.

258

See discussion of Simmon, supra, Note 73.

259

Cal. Rev. and Tax Code, §17745(c).

260

Supra, Note 239.

261

Clearly this statute was the predecessor and model for the federal throwback rules. See supra Note 246.
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The McCulloch opinion and Professor Traynor’s article stand for the clear
proposition that a state of the settlor’s or beneficiary’s residence cannot constitutionally
tax a foreign trustee. Gavin’s citation of McCulloch as authority was wholly misplaced.

IX.

McCulloch Is Not Precedent for Gavin.
McCulloch262 is the only case the Gavin opinion even attempted to claim as
precedent for its holding as to Connecticut’s taxation of the New York inter vivos trustee.
Gavin mischaracterized McCulloch as “a closely analogous”263 case. McCulloch is not
closely analogous to Gavin on its facts, on applicable law, or on its holding. As analyzed
below, McCulloch in no way established even the slenderest precedential thread for
Gavin’s wholly unprecedented holding.
On the facts, McCulloch was an action to recover income taxes assessed against
and previously paid by plaintiff, a California resident who was both a trustee264 and
beneficiary of a foreign trust.265 The California resident was one of three trustees.266
Pursuant to a very unique California statute,267 the beneficiary had paid the California tax
262

See supra, Note 23.

263

Gavin, supra, Note 6.

264

See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §17743 (West 1994) (stating, “[w]here the taxability of income under this
chapter depends on the residence of the fiduciary and there are two or more fiduciaries for the trust, the
income taxable under Section 17742 shall be apportioned according to the number of fiduciaries resident in
this state pursuant to rules and regulations prescribed by the Franchise Tax Board”). One-third was an
allocable portion in McCulloch.
265

McCulloch v. Franchise Tax Bd., 390 P.2d 412, 414-15 (Cal. 1964). The testamentary trust was formed
and administered under the laws of the state of Missouri under the will of a Missouri decedent. Id. at 415.

266

Id. at 414. In Gavin, no trustee was a resident of Connecticut.

267

CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 17742 et. seq. (West 1994). See infra, 271. Connecticut had no similar
statute and the California statute was essential to taxation of the California beneficiary in McCulloch.
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levied on such resident beneficiary.268 The California beneficiary’s California tax was
calculated by inclusion of income distributed from the nonresident trustee in the
transferee beneficiary’s personal tax return.269
McCulloch was more closely analogous to Simmon270 than Gavin, except that
California had a statute271 which had no equivalent in Massachusetts, Connecticut, or
anywhere else. The provisions currently in effect are found in sections 17742 through
17746 of the California Revenue and Taxation Code.272

268

McCulloch, 390 P.2d at 415.

269

Section 17745(d) taxed the beneficiary anew on the distributed "income" and never makes the
beneficiary liable as a transferee for the unpaid taxes of the foreign trustee. See infra, Notes 273 and 284.

270

See supra, Note 73.

271

Section 18102 (now §17742) provided as follows:

Except as otherwise provided in Articles 2 and 4 of this chapter, the income of an estate
or trust is taxable to the estate or trust [nevertheless, See Section 18106 below and infra, Note
Error! Bookmark not defined.273. The tax applies to the entire net income of an estate, if the
decedent was a resident, regardless of the residence of the fiduciary or beneficiary, and to the
entire net income of a trust, if the fiduciary or beneficiary is a resident, regardless of the residence
of the settlor.
Section 18103 read as follows:
Where the taxability of income of a trust depends on the residence of the fiduciary and
there are two or more fiduciaries for the trust, the income taxable under Section 18102 shall be
apportioned according to the number of fiduciaries resident in this State pursuant to rules and
regulations prescribed by the commissioner.
Section 18105 provided in part: “[t]axes on income of an estate or trust which is taxable to the estate or
trust . . . shall be paid by the fiduciary.”
Yet, when such tax was not paid by the trustee, section 18106 [renumbered §17745] imposed personal
liability for taxes on trust income on the resident beneficiary to include such income in the beneficiary’s tax
return when the income was distributed. See McCulloch at 640-641, and infra Note 273.
272

Cal. Rev. & Tax Code §§ 17742-17746 (West 1994).
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Section 17745273 is entitled “Income Taxable to Beneficiaries.” The title “Income
Taxable to Beneficiaries” is clearly an irrefutable declaration that “income” is taxable to
the “beneficiary.” Section 17745 specifically provides as follows:
(a) If, for any reason, the taxes imposed on income of a trust which is taxable to
the trust because the fiduciary or beneficiary is a resident of this state are not paid
when due and remain unpaid when that income is distributable to the beneficiary,
. . . if the taxes are not paid when due, such income shall be taxable to the
beneficiary when distributable to him. . .
(d) The tax attributable to the inclusion of that income in the gross income of
that beneficiary for the year . . . shall be the aggregate of the taxes which would
have been attributable to that income had it been included in the gross income of
that beneficiary ratably for the year of distribution and the five preceding taxable
years, or for the period that the trust accumulated or acquired income for that
contingent beneficiary, whichever period is the shorter. (Emphasis added)
There are two reasons why the beneficiary is taxed on the distributed income but
spread over the years the trust had realized such income. First and foremost, it’s a
mechanism preferred by Professor Traynor for reducing the tax penalty on the
beneficiary.274 The penalty arose from taxing five or more years of income accumulation
to the beneficiary in a single year.275
Secondly, when a trust accumulates income, generally the trust is taxed and not
the beneficiary. When the accumulated funds are later distributed to the beneficiary,
federal and state tax law treats the income as having been inextricably commingled with
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West's Ann. Cal. Rev. & T. Code § 17745.

274

Substantially the same approach was utilized in the federal throwback rules where a complex trust was
used to shelter income. See infra, Note 284
275

This statute deliberately reflects the sentiment expressed by Professor Roger Traynor in his classic tax
article (See infra, Note 235) that the trust income distributed should not be included in the aggregate on the
beneficiary's tax return for the year of distribution. Due to progressive rate schedules, taxing the income
from years of trust accumulation to the beneficiary entirely in the year of distribution would constitute a tax
penalty on the beneficiary who exercised no control over the trust's decision to accumulate.
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and become a part of nontaxable trust principal.276 This tax principle “would prevent
taxation of accumulated income when received by the beneficiary. This would in effect
obstruct taxation of such income altogether whenever it were derived from intangibles, in
view of the difficulties in reaching either of the other parties [settlor or trustee].” Having
a statute that levies, but does not collect, a tax on the beneficiary during each year the
trust has income avoids a later argument by the beneficiary that he or she can’t be taxed
in the year of distribution since the previously accumulated income might now constitute
principal under state law.277
This second purpose is also clearly reflected in §17745, subsection (c), which
appears to be a direct reaction to the holding in Simmon,278 as follows:
(c) The tax on that income which is taxable to the beneficiary under subdivisions
(a) or (b) is a tax on the receipt of that income distributed or on the constructive
receipt of that distributable income. For purposes of this section income
accumulated by a trust continues to be income even though the trust provides that
the income (ordinary or capital) shall become a part of the corpus. (Emphasis
added.)
The McCulloch279 opinion did only what the statute mandated, no more and no
less. In McCulloch, no tax levied on the nonresident trustee was ever paid by anyone.280
No such tax was paid by the trustee. Nor was any such tax on the nonresident trustee
ever paid by the California resident beneficiary. Rather, the California resident
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See discussion of Simmon, supra Note 73 and accompanying text. See infra, Note 283.

277

Id. This is a state principal and income statutory issue, not a constitutional question.
plaintiff/beneficiary in McCulloch unsuccessfully made this argument.
278

See supra, Note 73

279

See supra, Note 23.

280

Infra, Note 283.
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The

beneficiary paid only a separate and distinct tax calculated on the pass through of the
trust’s income to and inclusion with the beneficiary’s other taxable income and
deductions.281 Eminent academic commentators clearly disagree.282
In McCulloch, a Missouri trustee earned, but accumulated, income each year from
1946 through 1950. “The trust paid state income taxes to Missouri upon its income for
the years 1946 to 1950 inclusive; it paid no income tax to California during that period.”
283

California “imposed upon plaintiff [beneficiary] liability for income taxes upon the

accumulated income [subsequently] distributed by the trust …”284
In 1951, when the terminal distribution was made to the California beneficiary,
California, then and only then, levied a separate income tax on the beneficiary.285 The
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See supra, Note 273.

282

3 J. Hellerstein & W. Hellerstein, State Taxation (2005), ¶ 20.09, states as follows: "Finally, the
California Supreme Court relied on the presence of an in-state beneficiary to sustain the state's power to tax
a trust, created by a nonresident decedent and administered outside the state, on income it was
accumulating for the in-state beneficiary. The trust, which was administered in Missouri, had failed to pay
taxes to California on the accumulated income, and, upon distribution of the accumulated income to the
beneficiary, the beneficiary became liable for the trust's tax." (Emphasis added).
Again, the beneficiary did not "become liable for the trust's tax" as it would have if the statute had actually
provided for a "transferee tax." Instead, the beneficiary became liable for the beneficiary's own tax on
income passed-through from the trust.

283

McCulloch, 390 P.2d at 416. “Since the trust failed to pay this state’s tax upon its annual income,
California can constitutionally tax the beneficiary at the time he receives the accumulated income; …” Id.
at 414-15 (emphasis added).
284

Id. at 415. The statute was the predecessor of the federal “throwback rules” imposing a tax directly on
the beneficiary at the time of distribution. See e.g. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §665. California’s very unique
tax on the beneficiary of a trust is not a typical transferee tax provision. Indeed, it is a misnomer to describe
it as a “transferee tax” at all. In actuality, it is merely a new direct tax on the trust beneficiary as the result
of trust income being distributed, i.e., “transferred to,” and taxed directly to such beneficiary. For typical
transferee tax liability, see e.g., §26 U.S.C.A. 6901 (Transferee of property is liable for Transferor's
unpaid income and/or transfer taxes plus a pro rata portion of any interest owed by Transferor thereon to
the extent of FMV of property received from the Transferor.)
285

Ca. Rev. & Tax Code, §17745(a), “… such income shall be taxable to the beneficiary when distributable
to him.”
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tax calculation and its collection clearly and deliberately fell solely on the California
beneficiary, not the Missouri trustee.286
Although the statute ostensibly undertook to initially tax the foreign trustee on its
undistributed annual income in 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950, both the statute and the
Supreme Court of California ultimately placed the real tax burden on the California
beneficiary.287
The California Supreme Court in its McCulloch opinion, clearly and correctly
held that the residence of a beneficiary of a foreign trust was a sufficient basis for
California to tax such California resident beneficiary.288 As noted by the Connecticut
Supreme Court in Gavin, “[w]e agree with the reasoning of the California Supreme Court
that ‘the laws of the state of residence afford benefit and protection to the resident
beneficiary [no reference to the foreign fiduciary]....’”289 Further, the Gavin opinion also
correctly agreed with the California Supreme Court’s statement in McCulloch that:
The tax imposed by California upon the beneficiary [no reference to the
foreign trustee] is constitutionally supported by a sufficient connection
with, and protection afforded to, [the] plaintiff as such beneficiary . . .
California grants the beneficiary [no reference to the foreign trustee] the
interim protection of its laws so that he [the beneficiary] may ultimately
obtain the benefit of the accumulated income . . . [The] [p]laintiff’s
[Beneficiary’s] residence here confers the essential minimum connection
… necessary for due process of law, [i.e., unquestionably satisfies due

286

See supra, Notes 273 and 283 and accompanying text.
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The opinion did not require the beneficiary to pay the trust’s tax or associated interest for late payments
back to 1946.
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McGuire v. Trefry, 253 U.S. 12 (1920) (holding that Massachusetts can tax its resident beneficiary on
distributed current income from a Pennsylvania trust). See Walter L. Nossaman, State Taxation of Income,
24 CAL. L. REV. 524 (1936).
289

Gavin, 733 A.2d at 802 (emphasis added) (quoting McCulloch, 390 P.2d at 412).
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process for taxation of the resident California or Connecticut beneficiary,
but does not support taxation of the foreign trustee in either case].290
The Gavin opinion then jumps from Connecticut’s right to tax its own resident
beneficiary as in McCulloch, to claim a state’s right to tax a foreign trustee who has no
connection, minimum or otherwise, with the State of Connecticut.291

This is an

unsustainable and utterly indefensible leap in logic.
This flawed logic then led the Supreme Court of Connecticut to make its decision
to disregard a contradictory, but well-reasoned, body of precedent. As the Gavin opinion
itself stated in footnote 25, “[w]e disagree, therefore, with the reasoning of those cases
relied on by the plaintiff in which courts have found the domicile of a beneficiary of an
inter vivos trust insufficient for due process purposes.”292 Courts have long held that the
domicile of a beneficiary was an insufficient contact to satisfy due process requirements
for taxation of an otherwise foreign trustee.293
The McColloch opinion clearly addressed “due process” from the standpoint of
California’s imposing a tax on its own resident beneficiary just as Missouri had properly
taxed the trustee resident in Missouri:
We find no reason in constitutional principles or in practical application . .
. why the tax [on the beneficiary] founded upon the residence of the
beneficiary should not be sustained. We shall point out that just as the
290

Id. (emphasis added) (3rd & 7th alteration in original) (quoting McCulloch, 390 P.2d at 412).
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The mere attributed benefit of Connecticut law is insufficient for either due process or commerce clause
purposes. See Shaeffer supra, Note 283. Of course, a beneficiary’s residence in a state supports taxation of
such resident beneficiary. This is all the California Supreme Court did in McCulloch.
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Gavin, 733 A.2d at 802 n.25. The court refers to Blue v. Dep’t of Treasury, 462 N.W.2d 762 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1990); Potter v. Taxation Division Director, 5 N.J. Tax 399 (1983); Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust
Co. v. Murphy, 203 N.E.2d 490 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964). Id.
293

See supra, Part III. B., and Simmon, supra, Note 73.
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protection and benefits afforded by the state of the residence of the trustee
[e.g., Missouri]294 serve as the basis for the constitutionality of the
[Missouri] tax as to him, so do those factors serve as the basis for the
constitutionality of the [California] tax as to the beneficiary.295
In McCulloch, Missouri taxed its trustee. In like manner, California imposed a
tax on its resident California beneficiary. The opinion, like §18106,296 repeatedly made it
clear that California’s tax was ultimately on the beneficiary:
We conclude that California could constitutionally tax plaintiff as
the resident beneficiary upon the accumulated income when it was
distributed to him.297 (Emphasis added)
Connecticut in Gavin and Massachusetts in Simmon, unlike California in
McCulloch, lacked a state statute to impose a tax on the Connecticut or Massachusetts
beneficiary, respectively, upon receipt of the trust’s accumulated income.
The Gavin opinion engaged in a logical disconnect by holding that since
Connecticut could298, but statutorily did not, tax the Connecticut beneficiary; it had nexus
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With one of three trustees resident in California, California could have imposed a pro rata one-third tax
based on trustee residence in California. See supra, Note 271 re former §18103.

295

McCulloch, 390 P.2d at 418 (emphasis added). The tax imposed by California upon the beneficiary is
constitutionally supported by a sufficient connection with, and protection afforded to, plaintiff as such
beneficiary. The state of residence of a trustee can tax, i.e., can have minimum contacts to tax, the trustee’s
income.
296

§18106 has been renumbered as §17745. See supra, Note 273 and accompanying text of subsections (a)
and (d).
297

McCulloch, at 420-21 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

298

Under Due Process, Connecticut “could” have taxed its resident beneficiary upon distribution. Under
Connecticut state statutes, however, Connecticut, like Massachusetts in Simmon, could not tax the resident
on the distribution of accumulated income.
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to tax the foreign trustee. Therein lies the fundamental and very dangerous flaw in the
opinion’s unprecedented holding.299

X.

Pre- and Post-Gavin State Residency Rules for Trustees
States have historically applied myriad nexus rules to trustee taxation.300
California’s approach, established statutorily and judicially upheld by Professor Roger
John Traynor, was discussed above.301 Idaho, similar to Missouri in Swift,302 taxes
“trusts” as residents if they satisfy at least three out of five (six in Swift) characteristics:303
A New York “resident” trust, i.e., created by a New York resident settlor, is a
nonresident trust for income tax purposes if “(1) all trustees are domiciled in a state other
than New York;304 (2) the entire corpus of the trust, including real and tangible personal
property, is located outside of New York State [non-business intangibles deemed located
outside the state]; and (3) all income and gains of the trust are derived from, or connected
with, sources outside of New York State.”305 New Jersey has a similar standard. “If a
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Attribution to the nonresident of benefits of Connecticut law to the Connecticut beneficiary was rejected
by the Supreme Court in Shaffer, since the necessary relationship to the fiduciary's income earned in New
York was insufficient for both due process (Shaffer) and commerce clause (Complete Auto, Step Four)
purposes. See supra, Note 283.
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Nenno and Sparks, Delaware Dynasty Trusts, Total Return Trusts, and Asset Protection Trusts, printed
by Wilmington Trust Bank.
301

See discussion supra Part VII.

302

Swift v. Director of Revenue, 727 S.W.2d 880 (Mo. 1987) (en banc).
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See supra, Note 146
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See, e.g., In re John Frankel Trust, 1980 N.Y. Tax LEXIS 39 (New York State Tax Commission)
(holding that a trust created by New York resident and administered under Connecticut law could be taxed
as “resident” New York trust where majority of trustees were New York residents).
305

N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 105.23 (2003).
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resident trust or estate does not have any assets in New Jersey or income from New
Jersey sources, and does not have any trustees or executors in New Jersey, it is not
subject to New Jersey tax.”306
At least one nationally respected Connecticut commentator, Mr. Frank Berall,307
at the time of the adoption of Connecticut’s current income tax on trusts, analyzed
Connecticut’s tax statute as being in the mainstream.308 In many respects, Mr. Berall
stated parallels between New York and Connecticut law as follows:
A resident trust will not be taxed if all its trustees are nonresidents, its
entire corpus is located outside Connecticut and all its income and gains
are derived from or connected with sources outside Connecticut.309
Anticipating the Gavin issue, though not its holding, Mr. Berall further stated:
The fact that such a trust still has resident beneficiaries should not make it
a resident trust. A tax cannot be imposed by Connecticut merely because
trust beneficiaries reside here, if the trust’s assets are possessed by a
trustee in another state; otherwise it would violate the due process
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution.310

306

Form NJ-1041, Instructions, 2002 New Jersey Gross Income Tax Fiduciary Return.
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Frank S. Berall, formerly of the Hartford Bar and former frequent national lecturer on income taxation
of trusts and on estate planning.
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Frank S. Berall & Suzanne Brown Walsh, Income Taxation of Estates and Trusts, 65 CONN. B.J. 377
(1991).
309

Id. at 378 (emphasis added).

310

Id. (emphasis added) (citing Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83 (1929); Guaranty Trust
Co. v. Virginia, 305 U.S. 19, 23 (1938); Mercantile Safe-Deposit and Trust Co. v. State Tax Commission,
19 A.D.2d 765 (3rd Dept. 1963). These cases were rejected by the Gavin opinion’s wholly unprecedented
holding. See supra Note 262 and accompanying text.
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It seems that local politics and desperation for more state revenue have contributed to the
dangerous, unprecedented holding of Gavin.311
Conclusion
The result in Gavin is not consistent with the relations of states within the
American Union or with the expectations of U.S. citizens.312 Instead of butchering
constitutional limitations on state taxation of foreign trustees, whether testamentary or
inter vivos, states should merely review and revise their own rules on taxation of grantors,
trustees, and beneficiaries.
Unconstitutionally expansive Founder State Trust rules are not the answer. Like
Justice Traynor, states should look to adoption and/or modification of traditional federal
grantor trust rules and throwback rules. Too many states merely conform their grantor
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The same pressures can be seen in Alabama’s new resident trust tax statute. HB19 was part of a
comprehensive trust tax reform package enacted by the Alabama legislature. HB19 defined a resident trust
as a trust that is described in either (a) or (b) below:
(a) A trust: (1) Created by the will of a decedent who was an Alabama resident at
death or . . . who was an Alabama resident [including seven-month nondomiciliary
resident] at the time the trust became irrevocable; and (2) For more than seven
months during the taxable year, an individual who either resides in [nondomiciliary
resident] or is domiciled in Alabama is either a fiduciary of the trust or a beneficiary
to whom distributions may currently be made. [OR] (b) a trust that has Alabama as
its principal place of administration during the taxable year.
Clearly, a nondomiciliary resident could meet the requirements of both (a)(1) and (a)(2). A Florida
domiciliary could, for example, have established a Florida or a Delaware trust and a permissive beneficiary
of such a trust. A clear example could be a Delaware self-funded spendthrift trust. If, for unrelated
business reasons, the Florida resident spent seven months in Alabama and either died in an auto crash or for
some other reason the trust became irrevocable, the Delaware trust of a Florida resident with a Delaware
trustee is forever an Alabama resident trust.
Tying taxation solely to trust administration is similarly flawed. A Texas resident could establish a trust
with the Texas affiliate of an Alabama bank holding company. If, wholly unbeknownst to the Texas
settlor, all the holding company’s trust administration is conducted at its Alabama headquarters, the trust
will be taxed forever as a resident Alabama trust.
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See Jacob, supra, Note 5.
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trust rules to federal grantor trust rules. Under I.R.C. § 679, the federal government taxes
a U.S. citizen on all income of a foreign, i.e., outside the U.S., trust that has a U.S.
beneficiary and was established by the U.S. grantor. A state which conformed to federal
grantor trust rules, could, under its counterpart of Section 679, tax its citizen grantors on
trusts they might establish in Bermuda as a tax haven. However, if the same state
resident grantor created a similar trust in Delaware as a state tax haven, it is not a
“grantor” trust for federal purposes or for conforming state law purposes.
States like Connecticut that are interested in taxing income placed in out-of-state
trusts by Connecticut residents, should establish grantor trust rules which parallel § 679,
but which define a “foreign” trust as being established and domiciled outside the state of
Connecticut, not merely outside the U.S. This approach does, of course, subject the
trust’s income to the risk double taxation which should be mitigated by income allocation
or tax credits as required by Complete Auto’s commerce clause analysis.
Likewise, states like Connecticut, that want to tax a foreign trustee’s accumulated
income based on the state’s benefits provided to the trust’s beneficiary, should adopt laws
similar to California’s throwback rules. Such laws could parallel federal throwback rules
which were in turn based on California’s Traynor tax model. Throwback rules would
impose the state income tax on its resident beneficiary at the time of a subsequent
distribution. Today, under the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, federal “throwback rules”
apply primarily to foreign, i.e. non-U.S., trusts.313 The federal rationale and need of the
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26 U.S.C.
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throwback rules for foreign trust taxation serves essentially the same remedial purpose
states need to apply to out-of-state trusts with resident beneficiaries.314
Gavin is a badly flawed ruling which, in most respects, has no precedent
whatsoever. It was founded on state desperation for revenues and local politics by
reflecting the tax adage “Don’t tax you, don’t tax me, tax the fella behind the tree.” In
Gavin, the “you” and the “me” are Connecticut resident settlor’s and beneficiaries, and
the “fella behind the tree”, is a nonresident trustee.
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